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I. INTRODUCTION
It has all the ingredients of a Hollywood epic: sex, religion and
law packaged into a tense drama of authority and power in a dusty
town. Here are raw defiance and a nagging church; the social out-
cast against entrenched power; hypocrisy and self-righteousness.
Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter' and Hester Prynne have nothing on
this tale. But it's all true!
Marian Guinn had been more than a casual member of the
125-member Church of Christ of Collinsville, Oklahoma, a small
town of 2,200. Members of the church, including one of the defend-
ants, Elder Ron Witten, had assisted her in moving to Collinsville
with her children. The church had given her a car on one occasion,
1. N. HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1860).
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set up an account for gasoline, and provided babysitters while she
studied for her graduate equivalency diploma. When she com-
pleted those studies, the church threw a party for her. It did the
same when she graduated from Tulsa Junior College.
In 1980, when the three elders heard reports that she was hav-
ing an affair with then-Mayor Pat Sharp, they confronted her. In
Collinsville, secrets were perhaps hard to keep, and Marian admit-
ted that there were rumors about town concerning her and Sharp.
Sharp's former wife later suggested Marian was partly to blame for
the breakup of her marriage.
In the summer of 1981, when the elders heard further reports
of an ongoing affair, they insisted she meet with them. They
prayed with her and urged her to break off the relationship. Fi-
nally, after a stormy confrontation, church leaders warned her in a
letter of September 21, 1981.
Dear Sister Marian:
It is with tremendous concern for your soul and the welfare of the
Lord's church that we exhort you to consider the impact of the
results of the course you have elected to pursue. We have and will
continue to follow the instructions set forth in the Scriptures in
dealing with matters of church discipline. The Lord set forth the
procedure in Matthew 18:15-17. We have confronted you person-
ally ... however to date you have not responded, so you leave us
no alternative but to 'tell it to the church' . . . . It is the prayer-
ful desire of the entire body of Christ that you correct this serious
matter and avert the 'withdrawing of fellowship' of the saints.2
Marian declared it was "none of their business." On September 24,
she wrote to the church:
I do not want my name mentioned before the church except to
tell them I withdraw my membership immediately! I have never
accepted your doctrine and never will. Anything I told was in con-
fidence and not meant for anyone else to hear. You have no right
to get up and say anything against me in church .... I have no
choice but to attend another church, another denomination where
men do not set themselves up as judges for God. He does his own
judging.'
On September 27, the church read to the members of the con-
2. Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, No. C.T. 81-929 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa
County, Okla. filed Nov. 23, 1981), Plaintiff's exhibit 1.
3. Id., Plaintiff's Brief in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
1987]
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gregation a letter asking them to contact Marian about the condi-
tion of her soul and giving her until October 4 to repent. 4 On Octo-
ber 5, 1981, and in a subsequent letter to the members, the church
noted Scriptures they believed Marian had violated, removed her
name from the rolls, and called on members to "continue to pray
on her behalf and to contact her for purposes of encouragement
and exhortation." 5 Then the church forwarded the letter to four
sister congregations in the immediate area with which the church
had a close relationship.
Miss Guinn responded by filing suit6 against the church and
its three elders, Ron Witten, Allan Cash, and Ted Moody. The
complaint claimed that the church's "public" discipline and dis-
missal of her was an "invasion of privacy" and that these revela-
tions were "highly offensive and of no legitimate interest" to those
informed.7 All of this, she alleged, "permanently injured and dam-
aged . . . her good name and reputation."8 Furthermore, she al-
leged that the "extreme and outrageous conduct" of the defend-
ants "recklessly caused severe emotional distress."9 The amended
complaint concluded that the "defendants should be punished
therefore and made an example to others."10
The Oklahoma jury concurred and awarded her $205,000 ac-
tual damages and $185,000 punitive damages.1 The national media
noted the decision." Marian was not alone in seeking legal re-
course for church discipline. Similar cases were soon filed across
the country, suggesting that Guinn was not a mere aberration on
the legal landscape but perhaps the sign of a new legal framework
in which church discipline cases may be successfully pressed.13
4. Id., Plaintiff's exhibit B.
5. Id., Plaintiff's exhibit 4.
6. Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, No. C.T. 81-929 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa
County, Okla. filed Nov. 23, 1981).
7. Id., amended complaint.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, No. C.T. 81-929 (Okla. Dist.
Ct., Tulsa County, Okla. March 16, 1984), appeal docketed, No. 62,154. The jury
actually awarded $895,000, but state law limited the award to $390,000.
12. See, e.g., A Premium Price on Casting Stones, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 26, 1984,
at 58; Suing Over Scarlet Letter, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 1984, at 46.
13. In California, John R. Kelly sued the Christian Community Church, its
pastor Ernest Gentile, and elders. Kelly v. Christian Community Church, No.
545117 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, Cal. filed Mar. 22, 1984). Kelly alleged
[Vol. 10:1
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Collinsville did not invent church discipline or develop some
aberrant view of Matthew 18.' It has a long, if controversial, reli-
gious tradition.15 Exercising moral guardianship over corporate life
that Elder Donald Phillips, a family counselor who undertook to counsel the
plaintiff, "disclosed confidential, intimate, and embarrassing details of his sexual
and marital life" and that the church "publicly released" this information and
"publicly excommunicated him in church services." The complaint alleged such
conduct was professional malpractice, a breach of fidiciary duty, and "outrageous
conduct" resulting in emotional distress. Kelly added counts for reckless and
careless negligence, invasion of privacy, and conspiracy. Kelly sought actual dam-
ages plus $5,000,000 for exemplary and punitive damages.
In Orange County, California, Jan Brown sued for $3,000,000 against officials
of the Fairview Church of Christ in Garden Grove for publicly denouncing her
divorce as "sinful behavior." Brown v. Fairview Church of Christ, No. 4277621
(Super. Ct. Orange County, Cal. filed Apr. 20, 1984). Pastor Ken Dart, the com-
plaint alleged, read a letter on Jan. 22, 1984, saying that, "for so long as she ref-
uses to repent, none of us should keep company or associate with her in any way
that would suggest approval of these actions ... "
Pastor Grant Adkisson, other staff, and the deacons of the First Baptist
Church of Pagosa Springs were the targets in Shive v. Adkisson, No. 84 CV 6646
(Denver County Ct., Colo. filed Sept. 6, 1983). The complaint alleged that the
defendants had slandered the plaintiff, James Shive, before the congregation, ac-
cusing him of being a "heretic, deceiver, fornicator, covetor, idolator, liar, [and]
disorderly." Other counts in the complaint alleged libel, invasion of privacy, and
infliction of emotional distress by outrageous conduct in "wanton and reckless
disregard" of the plaintiffs. Each of seventeen claims sought damages of
$1,000,000.
In Santa Cruz, on October 14, 1984, Charles R. Roberson sued the Evangeli-
cal Orthodox Church, ten named church leaders, and 500 John Does in connection
with an alleged public revelation of plaintiff's "confidential" confession of marital
infidelity. Plaintiff was a former bishop of the Evangelical Orthodox Church. Rob-
erson v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, No. 981129 (Super. Ct. Santa Cruz
County, Cal. filed Oct. 15, 1984). The complaint is a shopping list of tort claims:
invasion of privacy, breach of fidiciary duty, false imprisonment, emotional dis-
tress, conspiracy, interference with prospective economic advantage, and other
charges. Roberson asked the court for $5,000,000 in general damages and
$5,000,000 in punitive damages.
See also Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1987) (overturning in
part a trial court's dismissal of action against a pastor grounded in claims of inva-
sion of privacy, ministerial malpractice, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
14. Matthew 18:15-17. This chapter from the Gospel of Matthew in the Holy
Bible contains instructions from Jesus on how the church is to respond to mem-
bers of the community who will not listen to the counsel of the church, including
a three-step process frequently applied by churches involving first, private con-
frontation; second, confrontation with a small group; and finally, involving the
whole church.
15. Despite the relative rarity of church discipline in major religious commu-
1987]
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has been a central aspect of the church mission and identity. Mar-
ian Guinn insisted, however, that the church's act intruded into
her privacy. She told the trial court that "[Wihat I do is between
God and myself" and insisted that the elders had no right to "mess
with someone else's life." Her attorney, Thomas Fraser, told the
jury in closing arguments, "I demand the right, on behalf of Mar-
ian Guinn, to lead her life the way she chooses."
Whose business was her conduct? Did the court properly pro-
tect Marian's privacy against an intrusive, judgmental, arrogant,
snooping cadre of moral busybodies? Or did the court invade and
chill the church's proper freedom for the exercise of church con-
cern over its common life? Is church discipline the business of the
church or the court? More especially, should relatively new torts
such as invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress be
nities today, it has a major place in Christian tradition, and many religious com-
munities see church discipline as an essential aspect of a faithful community. For
example, in the Reformation period it was described as "the third mark of the
church." "Church discipline is to be considered the normal church life," con-
cluded Marlin Jeschke in his study of the history of church discipline. Marlin
Jeshke, Toward an Evangelical Conception of Corrective Church Discipline,
Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1965, at 237. Church historian
George Marsden insisted that "church discipline . . . is as American as apple
pie." Quoted in Green, Church Discipline: Can Courts Pass Judgment?, THE
REGISTER, Apr. 29, 1984, Al, 18, 19. Theologian Emil Brunner noted, however,
that "[t]he function of church discipline has. . . to a very great extent fallen into
disuse. . . . The Church ought to know, however, that the absence of any kind of
church discipline inevitably gives the impression that to belong or not to belong
to the Church comes to the same thing in the end, and makes no difference in
practical life . . . ." E. BRUNNER, THE DIVINE IMPERATIVE 558, 559 (1947).
For a review of the history and development of concepts and practices of
church discipline, see Herbert Bouman, Biblical Presuppositions for Church Dis-
cipline, CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY, Vol. XXX, No. 7 (July 1959), at 503-
15; STUDIES IN CHURCH DISCIPLINE (Newton, Kansas: Mennonite Publishing Office,
1958); Brown, The Role of Discipline in the Church, THE COVENANT QUARTERLY,
Aug. 1983, at 51; M. Jeschke, Toward an Evangelical Conception of Church Dis-
cipline, supra note 5; C. Cadoux, The Early Church and the World (1925); B.
Poschmann, PENANCE AND THE ANNOINTING OF THE SICK (F. Courtney trans. 1964);
K. Latourette, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY (1953); H. Lea, A HISTORY OF AURICU-
LAR CONFESSION AND INDULGENCES IN THE LATIN CHURCH, Vol. 1 (1896); Nelson,
Comment, XXXVI (3) THE COVENANT QUARTERLY, Aug. 1977; Discipline and
Identity, 35 (1) REFORMED REVIEW 18 (1981); Runzo, Communal Discipline in the
Early Anabaptist Communities, an unpublished doctoral dissertation, University
of Michigan, 1978; Davis, No Discipline, No Church: An Anabaptist Contribution
to the Reformed Tradition, XIII (4) SIXTEENTH CENTURY JOURNAL (1982); Mills,
The Relationship of Discipline to Pastoral Care in Frontier Church, 1800-1850,
16 (Dec.) PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY 22 (1965).
[Vol. 10:1
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marshalled against church discipline? Is the court about to force
the church out of the discipline business?' 6 Can the Amish shun an
errant brother?' 7 Can members silence comment on their conduct
by a timely withdrawal? Can a church expel members but be le-
gally required to keep quiet about why?'
8
Church discipline legal issues are part of a larger debate over
government entanglement with religion and the scope of constitu-
tional protections for religion in the face of such regulatory activ-
ity.'9 More centrally, however, church discipline cases reflect a
growing tendency for disgruntled members and others to seek judi-
cial recourse for their grievances against church and religious lead-
ers. There are a number of tort actions that members may assert
against churches and their religious leaders for their acts and
teachings. These include: actions for clergy malpractice in counsel-
ing contexts;2" parental actions for infliction of emotional distress
16. The Guinn case brought these religious tensions to the surface at a time
when there is a renewed interest in the whole issue of church discipline. See, e.g.,
D. Baker, BEYOND FORGIVENESS: THE HEALING TOUCH OF CHURCH DISCIPLINE
(1984); Benaware, Mind Your Own Business, MOODY MONTHLY, Jan. 1984, at 24-
27; Patterson, Discipline: The Backbone of the Church, LEADERSHIP, Winter,
1983, at 108-13; Stafford, The Tightrope: A Case Study in Church Discipline,
LEADERSHIP, Summer, 1984, at 40-48; Baker, The High Cost of Church Discipline,
ETERNITY, Sept. 1984, at 29-31.
17. See Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., 819
F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming a district court ruling barring recovery in that
case on first amendment free exercise grounds).
18. The issue is far broader than rural Oklahoma fundamentalist churches. It
is bigger than merely local church autonomy. Noted theologian Martin Marty de-
clared in response to the intervention of the Oklahoma courts, "[t]his is going to
get mighty sticky. There's no telling where it's going to go." For Forrest Mont-
gomery of the National Association of Evangelicals, the issue was central: "What's
at stake is the churches' very existence." Green, Church Discipline: Can Courts
Pass Judgment?, THE REGISTER, Apr. 29, 1984, A 18, 19. Catholic discipline issues
have emerged with increasing frequency in recent years, especially in the light of
what the controversial priest Andrew Greeley has called the emergence of the "do
it yourself Catholic." Discord in the Church, TIME, Feb. 4, 1985, at 54. Swiss theo-
logian Hans Kung, himself subject to discipline, complained that "a new phase of
Inquisition" has begun. Id. at 52. Notre Dame theologian Richard McBrien, chair-
man of the theology department, queried: "Are we back to book burnings, black-
listings, expulsion and even excommunications?" Id. at 52, 53.
19. See, e.g., Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A
Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1195 (1980).
20. See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Community Church, 157 Cal. App. 3d 912, 204
Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984), decertified and hearing denied, Aug. 30, 1984. For com-
ment on clergy malpractice claims see Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First
1987]
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with regard to their children's adherence to a religious group; ac-
tions alleging fraud in the failure of religious groups to keep their
promises;22 and actions by excommunicated members alleging in-
terference with business relations.23
The importance of developing a sound legal approach in
church discipline cases is intensified by a recognition of the serious
burden such suits place upon the exercise of religious beliefs. Tort
damage awards often implicate fundamental constitutional rights
and are, therefore, subject to constitutional scrutiny.2' The finan-
cial burdens that tort liability may create are potentially chilling
and are thus particularly subject to constitutional review to ensure
that free exercise is not being punished.25
Such burdens are particularly felt by unpopular religious
groups. Actions against such groups in recent years included false
Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 47 (1981); Breecher, Ministe-
rial Malpractice, LIBERTY, Mar.-Apr. 1980; Ericsson, Clergy Malpractice: Ramifi-
cations of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 163 (1981); Ministerial Malpractice:
Is It a Reasonable Fear?, 16 TRIAL 11-14, July 1980; Comment, Made Out of
Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19
CAL. W.L. REV. 507 (1983); Note, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the Good
Samaritan or a Blessing in Disguise, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 209 (1985).
21. See, e.g., Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1981) (parents of
convert to a religious sect suing for infliction of emotional distress); Meroni v.
Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity, 119 A.D.2d 200, 506
N.Y.S. 174 (1986).
22. Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, No. A77 04 05184 (Or. Cir. Ct.
Multnomah County Sept. 5, 1979) (jury verdict of $2,000,000), reversed and re-
manded, 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206, 1227
(1983), retrial No. A7704-05184 (Or. Cir. Ct., Multnomah County July 19, 1985)
(jury verdict of $39,000,000).
23. Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975).
24. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25. Allard v. Church of Scientology, 58 Cal. App. 3d 439, 129 Cal. Rptr. 797
(1976) (jury verdict of $100,000); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, No. A77
04 05184 (Or. Cir. Ct. Multnomah County Sept. 5, 1979) (jury verdict of
$2,000,000), reversed and remanded, 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577 (1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1206, 1227 (1983), retrial No. A7704-05184 (Or. Cir. Ct., Multno-
mah County July 19, 1985) (jury verdict of $39,000,000). In New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court noted the chilling effect of actual and
threatening financial losses from tort liability in defamation and made it the basis
for restricting such liabilities.
See also Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., 819
F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding application of state tort law to churches may
abridge free exercise rights of churches and members and that permitting tort
recovery would have the same effect as making the act unlawful).
[Vol. 10:1
8
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss1/1
SCARLET LETTER LAWSUITS
imprisonment,2" infliction of emotional distress, fraud, 8 and
brainwashing.29 States have shown a willingness to support paren-
tal concerns in regard to some activities of religious groups by
adopting conservatorship statutes permitting the temporary cus-
tody of adults in order to ascertain whether the adult was sub-
jected to impermissible mind control. 30 The potential for jury ver-
dicts in tort actions to reflect judgments about the religious groups'
doctrines and styles poses further concerns for assuring adequate
legal protections for churches in church discipline suits.
This article will review the legal issues related to church disci-
pline which are raised by Guinn. Part II will provide an overview
of the general legal bases for church rights of internal control and
discipline in associational and first amendment law. Part III will
note the traditional limited scope of tort claims, and defenses to
them, raised in church discipline cases. Part IV will note the newer
claims grounded in the modern torts of invasion of privacy and
infliction of emotional distress as represented by Guinn in church
discipline-related suits. Part V will suggest the rationale and bases
for heightened judicial protection of churches in church discipline
cases under both associational and first amendment law.
26. O'Moore v. Driscoll, 135 Cal. App. 770, 28 P.2d 438 (1933). For articles
generally discussing legal claims against "cults," see Delgado, When Religious Ex-
ercise is Not Free: Deprogramming and the Constitutional Status of Coercively
Induced Beliefs, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1071 (1984); Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gen-
tle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1977); Comment, Piercing the Religious Veil of the So-Called Cults, 7 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 655 (1980); Note, People v. Religious Cults: Legal Guidelines for
Criminal Activities, Tort Liability and Parental Remedies, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
1025 (1977).
27. Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, No. A77 04 05184 (Or. Cir. Ct.
Multnomah County Sept. 5, 1979) (jury verdict of $2,000,000), reversed and re-
manded, 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206, 1227
(1983), retrial No. A7704-05184 (Or. Cir. Ct., Multnomah County July 19, 1985)
(jury verdict of $39,000,000).
28. Kropinski v. World Plan Executive Council-United States, No. 85-2848
(D.D.C. Jan. 13, 1987).
29. Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1981); Turner v. Unification
Church, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of
World Christianity, 589 F. Supp. 10 (D. Mass. 1983).
30. See Note, Conservatorships and Religious Cults: Divining a Theory of
Free Exercise, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1247 (1978).
1987]
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II. LEGAL SOURCES OF RIGHTS OF CHURCHES TO EXERCISE
CHURCH DISCIPLINE
A. Rights of Association Include Rights to Control and Disci-
pline Membership
Rights of association are at the core of the rights of churches
to organize, engage in collective activities, and develop rules of or-
ganization and discipline consistent with their associational inter-
ests. These associational rights emerge both from notions of con-
tract and from constitutional protections afforded associational
relationships and expression. Though the Constitution does not
specifically speak to the right to form an association, its protec-
tions of speech and assembly have been held to imply such a right.
The Supreme Court stated that: "There is no longer any doubt the
First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly
group activity. Thus, we have affirmed the right to engage in asso-
ciation for the advancement of beliefs and ideals."3
The Constitution protects the rights of individuals to form as-
sociations to act in concert with others of like mind. 2 Associational
rights include the right to both intimate association and associa-
tional expressive activity.3  Such rights are entitled to strong pro-
tection against infringement. In NAACP v. Alabama, the Supreme
Court stated that "[sitate action which may have the effect of cur-
tailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny."34
Recent decisions have modified the expressive rights of an associa-
tion to control its own membership where the association is not an
intimate association marked by "relative smallness, a high degree
of selectivity . . . and seclusion" but is a "large and basically un-
31. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963).
32. The right of 'association,' like the right of 'belief,' is more than the
right to attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one's attitudes
or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by
other lawful means; association in that context is a form of expression or
opinion; and while it is not expressly included in the First Amendment
its existence is necessary in making express guarantees fully meaningful.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
33. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Intimate associa-
tions have greater constitutional protections because they play a "critical role in
the culture and traditions of the nation" and "foster diversity and act as critical
barriers between the individual and the state." To protect them thus "safeguards
the ability to define one's identity." Id. at 618-19.
34. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958), rev'd, 360 U.S. 240 (1959).
[Vol. 10:1
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selective group[]." 3 5 In most situations, church and religious as-
sociations would fall within the more highly protected classifica-
tion devised by Roberts v. United States Jaycees."
The rights of such protected associations are broad. They in-
clude the right to establish conditions of membership such as eligi-
bility and qualifications; and associations may impose whatever
terms they choose, if not contrary to the law. The grant of or re-
fusal to grant membership in a voluntary organization is "within
the complete control of the association, and the courts cannot com-
pel the admission of an individual into such an association. '37 Nor
may one denied membership sue for damages for such exclusion,
even where the exclusion may have been motivated by malice.38
35. Roberts, 468 U.S. 609, 632. Justice O'Connor, dissenting, focused not on
the size or intimacy of the group but on its purposes, permitting more interfer-
ence where the purposes were commercial. On intimate association and the issue
in Roberts, see Karst, Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980);
Linder, Freedom of Association after Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1878 (1984); and Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 1 (1977). Also, in Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Direc-
tors of Rotary International, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035 (1986), the court reversed a
trial court and held that injunctive relief barring.the dismissal of a local Rotary
Club from the international organization was proper. The court held that the Ro-
tary Club was a business establishment subject to the Unruh Act barring sex dis-
crimination. The court held that commercial aspects of Rotary and the high turn-
over of membership were "hardly indicative of intimate relationship." This
decision was affirmed in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987). In Isbister v. Boy's Club of Santa Cruz,
Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, modified, 40 Cal. 3d 585, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 170 P.2d 212
(1985), the court held that the Boy's Club of Santa Cruz was a "place of public
accommodation or amusement" and, thus, a "business establishment"; in the ab-
sense of an established need for the exclusion of girls, such an exclusion was an
"arbitrary form of discrimination." Id. at 587. The court cited the operation of a
large physical plant and a "substantial paid staff" as evidence of "business" and
specifically noted that mere non-commercial character did not bar the group from
being a "business establishment" under the Act. Id. In Curran v. Mount Diablo
Council of the Boy Scouts, 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, appeal dis-
missed, 104 S. Ct. 3574 (1984), the California Court of Appeal found "businesslike
attributes" in the Scouts' ownership of emblem and uniforms which are
franchised throughout the United States and in publishing and selling books. 147
Cal. App. 3d at 719.
36. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
37. See, e.g., North Dakota v. North Central Ass'n of College and Secondary
Schools, 23 F. Supp. 694 (D.C. Ill.), aff'd., 99 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1938).
38. 6 AM. Jun. 2D Associations and Clubs § 18 (1963). See State ex rel.
Baumhoff v. Taxpayers' League, 87 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App. 1935), and Trautwien
v. Harbourt, 40 N.J. Super. 247, 123 A.2d 30 (1956).
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Thus, associational rights include an inherent, internal legisla-
tive power that encompasses the right to establish its own binding
governance.
It is well established that a voluntary association may, with-
out direction or interference by the courts, draw up for its govern-
ment and adopt rules, regulations and by-laws which will be con-
trolling as to all questions of discipline, doctrine, or internal
policy; and its right to interpret and administer such rules and
regulations is as sacred as its right to make them. 9
These associational rights also extend to the right to determine the
basis and procedures for disciplinary practices within the associa-
tion. An association has the "power to relieve itself of its discor-
dant members" and thus the right to "establish by-laws providing
for the expulsion of members transgressing their reasonable
provisions."4
Individuals who associate themselves may prescribe condi-
tions upon which membership may be acquired, or upon which it
may continue and may also prescribe rules of conduct for them-
selves during their membership, with penalties for their violation,
and a tribunal and mode in which the offenses shall be deter-
mined and the penalty enforced."1
The appropriate tribunal set up by the association makes decisions
under such rules. The decisions concerning internal disciplinary af-
fairs are traditionally conclusive except in cases of "fraud, collu-
sion, or arbitrariness."42
39. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Associations and Clubs § 5 (1963). This power is not unlim-
ited; but if the regulations of the association are not immoral, unreasonable, ille-
gal, or in violation of a strong public policy, they will be held valid and binding on
all members. This is true even if the effect of these rules is to limit freedoms
individuals might otherwise have had were it not for their voluntary membership.
See, e.g., North Dakota v. North Cent. Ass'n of College and Secondary Schools, 23
F. Supp. 694, aff'd, 99 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1938).
40. See Del Ponte v. Society Italiana, 27 R.I. 1, 60 A. 237 (1905).
41. Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613, 50 P. 763, 764 (1897).
42. Harris v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 1 F. Supp. 946, 949 (E.D. Ill. 1931), specif-
ically citing decisions of church tribunals. See also Green v. Obergfeld, 121 F.2d
46, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 637 (1940), noting "[nlo judicial interference with intra-
associational affairs ... in the absence of special circumstances showing injustice
or illegal action." Id. at 55. See also 6 AM. JuR. 2D Associations and Clubs § 27
(1963). The powers of an association to provide for suspension and expulsion of
members are inherent in the association itself, what some courts call the police
power of an organization. One court referred to this right to expel members as
[Vol. 10:1
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In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church,48 the Supreme Court applied these basic associational
rights to religious bodies. In the area of church discipline, courts
applying associational rights explicitly affirm the right of churches
to promulgate rules that regulate the expulsion of members, and
such rules are binding on all of their members.44 The Supreme
Court in Bouldin v. Alexander45 declared "we have no power to
revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline, or of exclu-
sion from membership. '40
Thus, principles of associational rights provide a major source
of church authority to develop standards of membership and prac-
tices and procedures for disciplining and expelling members. The
right to form such associations is constitutionally protected, and
the right to develop such internal norms and procedures arises
both from constitutional principles and the implied consent of per-
sons who affiliate with such associations to be bound by their
procedures.
B. Rights of Internal Control Assured by First Amendment's Re-
ligion Clause
In refraining from interference with church decisions, the
courts stress not only associational law but also the general princi-
ples of religious liberty.47 The Supreme Court set the tone in 1871
when it declared:
[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiasti-
cal rule, custom or law have been decided by the highest of these
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the le-
gal tribunals must accept these decisions as final, and binding on
them .... The right to organize voluntary religious associations
...and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted ques-
rooted in "a basic law of self-preservation." Club members impliedly agreed to
abide by the rules by joining. Lawrence v. Ridgewood Country Club, 635 S.W.2d
665 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982). See Chaffe, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not
for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993 (1930).
43. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
44. 66 AM. JUR. 2D Religious Societies § 12 (1973) (citing Jones v. State, 28
Neb. 495, 44 N.W. 658 (1963)).
45. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
46. Id. at 139.
47. For a list of such cases in various jurisdictions, see Annotation, Suspen-
sion or Expulsion from Church or Religious Society and the Remedies therefor,
20 A.L.R.2D 421, 435 (1951).
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tions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical gov-
ernment of all the individual members . . . is unquestioned. All
who united themselves to such a body do so with an implied con-
sent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it
would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of
such religious bodies, if anyone aggrieved by one of their deci-
sions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed.
It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to
establish tribunals . . . that those decisions should be binding in
all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals
as the organism itself provides for.48
The drafters of the Constitution centrally concerned them-
selves with the "core ideal of religious autonomy," the protection
of religious life from governmental interference. 9 While the
phrases "separation of church and state" and "wall of separation"
are not part of the Constitution, the images reflect a commitment
prohibiting improper intrusions into either sphere. Long before
Thomas Jefferson used the "wall of separation" image in a letter to
the Danbury Baptists,5 0 Roger Williams used a similar image but
with a different connotation. For Williams, the wall was not so
much to keep the church out of the state where its moral influence
was critical but to keep the wilderness of the state from polluting
the garden of the church.
[W]hen they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation
between the Garden of the Church and Wilderness of the world,
God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the candle-
stick, and made His garden a wilderness, as at this day. And that
therefore, if he e'er please to restore His garden and paradise
again, it must of necessity be walled in peculiarly unto Himself
48. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727-29 (1871) (emphasis added).
49. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 812 (1978).
50. The letter at 16 Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 281-82 (1903), became the
source for later Supreme Court use of that language. See Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Referring to Justice Black's analysis of American
history in that case, Mark Howe declared that the "Court dishonored the work of
the historian." M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND Gov-
ERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 31, 34 (1965). Michael Malbin
spoke of "an incredibly flawed reading of the intent of the authors of the First
Amendment by the Court." M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS
OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978). Edwin Corwin noted that
"[u]ndoubtedly the Court has a right to make history, but it does not have the
right to remake it." (emphasis added). CORWIN, The Supreme Court as a Na-
tional School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 20 (1949).
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from the world .... 81
C. The Autonomy Precedents: Church Property Cases
The notions of "separation of church and state" antedate
modern church-state jurisprudence and the development of the an-
alytical tools of "establishment" and "free exercise" since the
1950s. Though these concepts were not carefully delineated in the
early church property cases, the courts generally refused to inter-
vene in church affairs because of the First Amendment and uti-
lized principles which seem founded in the same ideas later framed
by the Court more specifically as "entanglement" or free exercise
concerns.52 The key dynamic in early church property cases was
the petitioning of courts by church factions seeking judicial inter-
vention in administrative decisions that affected the control of
property. The Court very early expressed incompetence to decide
theological and doctrinal questions which were often at the core of
such property questions.
In 1871, the Court decided Watson v. Jones,53 "the many
splendored precedent, ' 54 a seminal case involving judicial decisions
about church affairs. A faction of the Walnut Street Presbyterian
Church of Louisville, Kentucky, split from the General Assembly
of the Presbyterian Church over disputes regarding slavery and the
civil war. The local congregation argued that the parent denomina-
tion departed from the doctrine of the church and, hence, the local
church was the true church entitled to the property. Kentucky
courts agreed and held that, while this property was held in a trust
for the parent church denomination, the "departure from doc-
trine" by the parent church denomination dissolved the trust so
51. R. WILLIAMS, A Letter of Mr. John Cotton in THE COLLECTED WRITINGS
OF ROGER WILLIAMS 392 (1963). For a discussion of Williams and Jefferson on "a
wall of separation" see M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965). In
contrast, Jefferson saw the wall as chiefly protecting the state. For example, he
would have barred clergy from holding public office, a policy attempted by Ten-
nessee but struck down by the United States Supreme Court in McDonald v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
52. In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976), the Court simply referred to the first and fourteenth amendments as bar-
ring review by the courts of church decisions.
53. 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
54. So described in Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution
of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1378, 1389 (1981).
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the local Kentuckians could have title to the property."
The United States Supreme Court rejected the "departure
from doctrine" concept and declared the Court's theological
incompetence.
The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of
no dogma, the establishment of no sect. . . . All who unite them-
selves to such a body [church/denomination] do so with an im-
plied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it.
But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total sub-
version of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of
their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them
reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their
right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising
among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all
cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as
the organism itself provides for."
Watson v. Jones57 established a principle of deference to hierarchi-
cal church decisions. Civil courts must accept as final and binding
the decisions of church authorities in questions of "discipline, or of
faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law."58
The Watson Court grounded its decision in several principles
relevant to church discipline cases today.59 First, the Court spoke
of "implied consent," the notion that the parties agreed to such a
governance, by stating: "All who unite themselves to such a body
do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound
to submit to it."60 This principle emphasizes the intent or agree-
ment of the parties and relies on. broad associational and contract
law concepts. When persons voluntarily join such a group, they
consent to the rules which govern that association.
Subsequent cases reiterate this consent or contract principle.
Later Supreme Court cases cited the Watson Court's "implied con-
sent" and "bound to submit" declarations. 1 Justice Brandeis in
55. Watson v. Avery, - Ky. (2 Bush) 332 (1869).
56. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. at 728-29.
57. 80 U.S. 679.
58. Id. at 727.
59. See Ellman, supra note 54, for a discussion of various underlying princi-
ples in the Watson decision.
60. 80 U.S. at 729.
61. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 711
(1976).
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Gonzalez v. Archbishop 2 applied the contract principle in sug-
gesting that "the decisions of the proper church tribunals on mat-
ters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are ac-
cepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because
the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise."63
Second, the Watson Court grounded its decision in a type of
subject-matter jurisdictional incompetence. This basis is a convic-
tion of the impermissibility of any court adjudication of doctrinal
matters. The deference is rooted not so much in the dispositiveness
of consensual agreements but in a larger principle of deference
based on the subject matter of religious doctrines. In one respect,
this incompetence is a jurisdictional concept-a constitutional in-
firmity grounded in the highly intrusive character of any theologi-
cal inquiry and decisionmaking, resulting in an engagement with
religion that would later be denounced as "excessive
entanglement."
Beyond that, however, a more practical component, that of a
"lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards," 4 ex-
ists. The courts speak of a sense of basic incompetence to deal with
such theological questions. 5 As the Watson Court stated, "[t]he
law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no
dogma, the establishment of no sect." 6 The Court's reluctance to
deal with such questions is not just a matter of respect for religion.
It goes to the very question of competence to understand and in-
terpret issues, even organizational questions, when they are infused
with theological contexts. Chaffee referred' to this as the "dismal
swamp" problem: the inevitable confusion and disorientation when
courts try to understand and decide issues which involve a vocabu-
lary, logic, and history about which they know nothing. 7 Inquiry
into religious doctrinal matters is "a forbidden domain, ' 8 and the
62. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
63. Id. at 16 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 [1871]).
64. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
65. "Any other than those [ecclesiastical courts] must be incompetent judges
of what constitutes an offense against the word of God and the discipline of the
church." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. at 732, citing German Reformed Church v.
Seibert, 3 Pa. St. 29 (1846).
66. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. at 728.
67. Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not-For-Profit, 43 HARV. L.
REv. 993, 1021 (1930).
68. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). This deference exists
notwithstanding the fact that, as Justice Jackson noted, "[t]he price of freedom of
religion or of speech or of the press is that we must put up with, and even pay for,
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Court consistently refuses such analysis.
The third factor in Watson's avoidance of intermeddling with
church issues reflects a broader "jurisdictional" approach-a
"strict deference" in which the Court recognizes "there is some
overriding concern for religious autonomy." 9 The Watson Court
noted that examining the validity of ecclesiastical decrees "would
deprive these bodies of the right of construing their own church
laws, would . . . in effect, transfer to the civil courts . . . the deci-
sion of all ecclesiastical questions."70
The courts frequently reiterate these principles of deference to
the theological and doctrinal affairs of churches. In Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral,71 the Court affirmed a "hands-off" approach
to any consideration of church doctrine and internal administra-
tive affairs and gave its decision constitutional dimensions rooted
in the free exercise clause. The Court struck down a New York law
aimed at freeing the American Russian Orthodox Church's St.
Nicholas Cathedral from Moscow's control.72 The issue was the va-
lidity of a New York statute that, in effect, gave control of the
church property to an American-based hierarchy free of Moscow.
The Court held the act improper. Citing Watson, it held that,
since the matter was really one of religious doctrine, it was
"strictly a matter for ecclesiastical government"; thus, any intru-
sion such as the legislature's was improper. 73 The Court spoke of a
"spirit of freedom for religious organizations, power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church govern-
ment as well as those of faith and doctrine. 74
At first blush, it might have seemed a simple property issue
warranting the Court's involvement. But, as Justice Frankfurter
noted, "St. Nicholas Cathedral is not just a piece of real estate
... . What is at stake here is the power to exert religious
authority. ' 75
Laurence Tribe noted the importance of the Kedroff Court's
a good deal of rubbish." Id. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
69. See Ellman, supra note 54.
70. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. at 734.
71. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
72. For a discussion see Note, 'And of your law, look ye to it' - The State's
Role in Ecclesiastical Property Disputes, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 138 (1977).
73. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115.
74. Id. at 116. For a modern church property decision relying on "compulsory
deference," see Fonken v. Community Church, 339 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1983).
75. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 121, 123 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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recognition of the essentially doctrinal character of the real issue,
even when the surface questions might seem legally justiciable, in-
dependent of religious questions. Additionally, Tribe noted the
dangers of permitting dissidents to have a "judicial platform" from
which to "air your religious differences with others and potentially
win a favorable verdict. ' '7' He warned of the dangers of permitting
an "open season on churches."' "7 He concluded:
It is not only the sanctity of religious conscience in the ab-
stract which has been of concern in these cases; it has also been
the integrity of religious associations viewed as organic units
.... Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized for nearly a quar-
ter century that, whatever may be true of other private associa-
tions, religious organizations as spiritual bodies have rights which
require distinct constitutional protection."8
The Court expressed the same strict deference in Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,79 which involved similar
leadership struggles in the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Court
extended protections from review to "disputes over church polity
and church administration" and set a high wall when it declared it
is:
the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are
reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not
rational or measurable by objective criteria. Constitutional con-
cepts of due process, involving secular notions of 'fundamental
fairness' or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly relevant
so
To allow a review of the criteria by which a court made its decision
was "exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits."'8
76. L. TRIBE, supra note 49, at 875.
77. Id. at 875.
78. Id. at 876.
79. 426 U.S. 696 (1976). In 1963, the mother church of the Serbian Orthodox
Church in Belgrade suspended and defrocked Milivojevich. In ordering the
bishop's reinstatement, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the prescribed
church procedure was not followed and that the actions of the mother church had
been arbitrary. The court stated these findings justified judicial interference and
the setting aside of the official hierarchy's decision. The United States Supreme
Court, however, held that the Illinois court engaged in an "impermissible rejec-
tion of the decisions" of the church and that this type of detailed review exceeded
the minimal review possible by civil courts of ecclesiastical affairs. Id. at 708, 720.
80. Id. at 714-15.
81. Id. at 713.
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In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memo-
rial Church,82 the Supreme Court again addressed. this issue. This
case involved a dispute alleging doctrinal departure involving two
Georgia Presbyterian congregations that sought to withdraw from
the Presbyterian Church in the United States. The Supreme Court
reiterated the view that the first amendment barred the courts
from interpreting and weighing doctrines, though it could utilize
"neutral principles of law" in property disputes.8 3 The Court in-
sisted that civil courts "must defer to the resolution of issues of
religious doctrine or polity to the highest court of a hierarchical
church organization. 8
These decisions reflect a broad principle of deference to
churches in the internal discipline and life of the church. This ju-
dicial deference is rooted in a recognition that courts are improper
forums for such debate. Involving the courts dangerously threatens
the integrity of religious life and organizations.
D. Establishment Clause Limits on Church Discipline Claims
The general principles established in the autonomy-property
cases continued to arise in later cases where, in great detail, the
Court analyzed questions involving "establishment" and "free ex-
ercise" concerns. Everson v. Board of Education8 5 established the
"separationist" tradition of the Court. Justice Hugo Black drew
heavily on Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists and declared
the first amendment erected a "wall of separation between church
and state" which must be "high and impregnable" so that not even
the "slightest breach" could be approved."6 A year later in McCol-
lum v. Board of Education, Justice Felix Frankfurter affirmed
this separationist faith: "[W]e renew our conviction that we have
staked the very existence of our country on the faith that complete
82. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
83. Id. at 449.
84. Id. at 446. The Court did note that it would be permissible to use "neu-
tral principles of law, developed for us in all property disputes" but noted that
such was not required in this case. The concept of employing neutral principles
was reaffirmed in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). The concept has drawn con-
siderable critical comment. See, e.g., Note, Jones v. Wolf: Neutral Principlqs
Standards of Review for Intra-Church Disputes, 13 Loy. OF L.A.L. REV. 109
(1979).
85. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
86. Id. at 18.
87. 333 U.S. 203, 232 (1948).
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separation of church and state is best for the state and for religion
. . . 'good fences make good neighbors.'"88
Over the next several years after Everson, the Court developed
the "tripartite test" for determining whether or not there was an
impermissible "establishment of religion." 89 The most relevant ele-
ment of this test, known as the Lemon9" test, for the issue of judi-
cially imposed civil liability for church discipline is the non-entan-
glement requirement.91 The basic idea of avoiding entanglement
reflects a judgment shared by many of the founding fathers and
expressed succinctly by Madison, who insisted that the national
government "has not a shadow of right . . . to intermeddle with
88. 333 U.S. 203, 232 (1948), citing in part Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, 59 (1947). Despite popular and some academic criticism of the imagery
of a "wall of separation," the metaphor remained and dominated church-state
jurisprudence. "A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech," Mc-
Collum, 333 U.S. at 247 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting). The Court at times de-
scribes the wall as "blurred, indistinct and variable," Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 614 (1971); insists that the Constitution does not require separation in
"every and all respects," Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952); and explains
that there must be "room for play in the joints," Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
89. In 1977, in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977), the Supreme
Court summarized the requirements of the establishment clause: the statute must
have a clear secular legislative purpose, a principal or primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster excessive government entan-
glement with religion. 433 U.S. at 231.
90. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
91. The non-entanglement requirement may, as Laurence Tribe suggests, just
be another way of looking at the same information one analyzes when exploring
whether there is an impermissible effect of inhibiting or aiding religion. That is,
has the conduct of government created a relationship which has an impermissible
effect? Some commentators have criticized the application of government regula-
tion to organizations such as churches as posing "establishment" claims under the
entanglement clause. They insist that the place to root or ground any exceptions
is in the free exercise clause. D. Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Reli-
gion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right of Church Au-
tonomy, 81 COL. L. REV. 1373 (1981). Others insist that free exercise protections
apply only to individuals because only they have consciences which can be co-
erced, and all other protections, such as those afforded a church, must be found
precisely in the non-entanglement prohibitions of the establishment clause. See
Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Government Interference with Reli-
gious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984). Seemingly, a better prin-
cipled argument is that collectivities have free exercise rights as well. Further, any
confinement of free exercise to individuals would seem to reflect more of a mod-
ern preoccupation with individualism than any realistic or historic sense of the
character of religion or the development of conscience.
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religion." 2
The Supreme Court first formally announced the non-entan-
glement principle in Walz v. Tax Commission.3 In upholding a tax
exemption for a religious organization, the Court noted that the
exemption was permissible in part because non-taxation permitted
a lesser degree of entanglement between government and religion.
In Lemon,94 the Court affirmed the excessive entanglement princi-
ple and made it the third prong of the tripartite test.95 There are
several different kinds of impermissible entanglements. They are
the doctrinal, administrative," and political.9 7
A frequent concern of the Court is entanglement in the con-
text of excessive government surveillance or oversight over the
management affairs of religious organizations" and the desirability
of both government and religion to be "left free of the other within
its respective sphere." 99 Surely a troublesome form of entangle-
ment would be any governmental attempt to resolve internal reli-
92. Address, Virginia Convention, June 12, 1788. THE COMPLETE MADISON
306 (Padover ed. 1953).
93. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
94. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
95. What is excessive is not self-evident because the test lacks clarity and
precision. Justice Byron White once referred to the test as "curious and mystify-
ing." Roemer v. Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 769 (1976) (White, J., concurring). A
number of articles criticize the entanglement analysis of the court. See Warner,
NLRB Jurisdiction Over Parochial Schools: Catholic Bishop of Chicago v.
NLRB, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 463 (1978); Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Reli-
gious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public
Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205 (1980); and Gianella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bit-
ter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 147.
96. The Lemon Court spoke of the dangers of comprehensive, discriminating,
and continuing surveillance of the programs, use of funds, and accounting by
churches and religious groups whenever federal aid goes to religious schools. Such
surveillance involves the government in the kind of review and monitoring which
are anathema to the Constitution. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 619. In Walz,
the concurring justices noted that it was critical to avoid contexts where there was
any "governmental evaluation" of religious practices, "state investigation into
church operations," 397 U.S. at 694 (Brennan, J., concurring), or any involvement
of government in "difficult classifications of what is or is not religious." Id. at 698
(Harlan, J., concurring).
97. The Court has referred to political divisiveness created by state involve-
ment with religious belief and practice as a "warning signal not to be ignored."
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
797-98 (1973).
98. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 619.
99. McCollum v. Board.of Education, 333 U.S. at 212.
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gious disputes. Laurence Tribe insists "the form of entanglement
the Supreme Court deems most subversive of first amendment val-
ues is that which involves government not only in the apparatus of
religion but in its very spirit-in its decision on core matters of
belief and ritual."' 0
While the concept of entanglement initially developed in fi-
nancial "aid" cases, it clearly applies to "regulation" cases as well.
If entanglement bars "aid" on the grounds of a constitutionally in-
tolerable mixing of religion and government, such arguments
would seem equally appropriate in cases of excessive governmental
regulatory action. The courts increasingly use the doctrine where
the issue is the permissible scope of government controls and when
such controls create precisely the kind of intrusion barred as exces-
sive. It is in this context that the doctrine argues strongly for court
deference to the disciplinary, doctrinal, and instructional aspects
of the church's life. Courts should not involve themselves in ques-
tions such as: when the members of a church may be advised of
disciplinary action taken against a member or former member or
what internal procedures are appropriate in processing the with-
drawal of a member under discipline. Allowing a court to decide
issues relating to church discipline is precisely the kind of exces-
sive entanglement that the court arguably should avoid.
Lower courts have recognized the dangers of such interference
and consistently resisted intrusion into such internal affairs by rec-
ognizing that "in matters purely religious or ecclesiastical, the civil
courts have no jurisdiction."' 01 The Nebraska Supreme Court as-
serted that religious freedom itself would not survive very long if
members, disgruntled about "some matter of religious faith or
church polity, could successfully appeal to the secular courts for
redress."' 2
E. Free Exercise, Church Autonomy, and Church Discipline
"[A] right to church autonomy under the free exercise clause
focuses on the real issues at stake. The right is the right of
churches to make for themselves the decisions that arise in the
course of running their institutions." 0 3 Free exercise claims
100. L. TRIBE, supra note 49, at 870.
101. Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo. 353, 378 (1873), cited by L. TRIBE, supra note
49, at 871.
102. Wehmer v. Fokenga, 57 Neb. 510, 518-19, 78 N.W. 28, 31 (1899).
103. Laycock, supra note 91, at 1394.
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emerge in terms both of individuals and of group contexts or com-
munal interests.104 Many, perhaps most, religious exercises take
place in the context of communities of faith. Free exercise rights
ought to include the rights of these communities to carry out their
lives of worship, discipline, and management without interference
from the government.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut,"5 West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, °6 Sherbert v. Verner,10 7 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder,'0 8 the Court developed strong commitments to free exercise
protections. The Court insisted that, as Chief Justice Burger stated
in Yoder:
[I]t must appear either that the State does not deny the free ex-
ercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state
interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming
protection under the Free Exercise Clause .... [O]nly those in-
terests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."0 9
A process of free exercise analysis resulted from these cases. When
there is a showing of a substantial burden on the exercise of a sin-
cerely held religious belief, such burdens must be justified by com-
pelling state interests and represent the least intrusive means.
Clearly, not every claim to free exercise will prevail. There are
state interests that will overcome the right of free exercise. ° To
104. See supra note 91.
105. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (The Court voided a breach of the peace conviction
against Newton Cantwell and his sons by insisting that "the power to regulate
must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the
protected freedom." Id. at 304).
106. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (The Court sustained a claim that a state statute
compelling school children to salute the flag was an infringement of the free exer-
cise of religion. The Court insisted that "freedoms of speech and of press, of as-
sembly and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are
susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests
which the State may lawfully protect." In effect, the Court was applying a free
speech analysis to the religious expression. Id. at 639).
107. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (involving a successful challenge on free exercise
grounds of a denial of unemployment benefits to the plaintiff because she refused
to accept work on the Sabbath).
108. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (sustaining on free exercise grounds the objection by
Amish to conviction for failure to send children to secondary schools as mandated
by state law).
109. 406 U.S. at 214-15.
110. E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). George Reynolds
[Vol. 10:1
24
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss1/1
SCARLET LETTER LAWSUITS
contend that government intrusion under the facts of present
church discipline cases is impermissible is not to assert that the
church is totally immune from public accountability regardless of
what it does. There are compelling interests which can overcome
the heavy presumption of non-interference. Should a church claim
the right to beat sinners into repentance or lock them up until they
have a repentant heart, the state's interest would prevail and the
church would be subject to the appropriate criminal penalties and
civil remedies. In such cases the state's interests are expressed
through the specificity, clarity, and legislative processes underlying
its criminal law and are not merely the product of individualized
judgment by jurors or judges.
III. TRADITIONALLY LIMITED SCOPE OF CHALLENGES TO CHURCH
DISCIPLINE
A. Procedural Challenges in Church Discipline Contexts
The strong commitments in the area of associational rights,
however, do not completely bar challenges to church disciplinary
proceedings. One of the major grounds for challenging dismissals
from membership is the challenge not to the right of the associa-
tion to control its membership but to the process that the associa-
tion/church uses. In many cases, challenges on procedural grounds
are the only ways in which the actual action of the church are
voided and members reinstated."'
These issues of procedure in church discipline cases deal, for
example, with whether the church gave proper notice to the per-
son(s) concerning the charges or the meetings to consider charges.
The cases also deal with whether there was an opportunity for a
hearing, or whether the proper body (e.g., deacons, elders, congre-
gation) in the church made the decision.
In In re Galilee Baptist Church,"2 the court set forth the lim-
unsuccessfully asserted a free exercise right to violate federal laws prohibiting po-
lygamy because his practices were rooted in religious convictions. The Court con-
cluded: "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot
interfere with mere religious belief or opinion, they may [interfere] with prac-
tices." Id. at 166.
111. For a general overview of issues and cases associated with challenges to
expulsions, see 66 AM. JUR. 2D Religious Societies § 12 (1973) and Annotation,
supra note 47.
112. 186 So. 2d 102 (Ala. 1966). This disagreement included the dismissal of
the pastor and removal of certain members from leadership positions with each
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ited basis for a procedural appeal and concluded:
Spiritualities are beyond the reach of temporal courts, and a
pastor may be deposed by a majority of the members at a congre-
gational meeting at any time, so far as the civil courts are con-
cerned, subject only to inquiry by the courts as to whether the
church, or its appointed tribunal has proceeded according to the
law of the church. 13
The usual form of such a challenge alleges that the association did
not follow its own rules and procedures. 14 In these situations, the
courts engage in a limited review to determine whether the expel-
ling organization acted in accordance with its own regulations.115
side holding meetings purporting to reverse what the other side had done. The
court assessed which church meetings were properly held and what constituted
adequate notice to members.
113. Id. at 106.
114. On such grounds, complaints successfully challenged dismissals on the
basis that the dismissal was by an authority not properly delegated such powers:
Burke v. Roper, 79 Ala. 138 (1885) (dismissed by the pastor in a congregational
church); Hatfield v. De Long, 156 Ind. 207, 59 N.E. 483 (1901) (improperly consti-
tuted tribunals); Keith v. Howard, 24 Pick. 292 (Mass. 1836) (unauthorized com-
mittee revising the church constitution); Briscoe v. Williams, 192 S.W.2d 643 (Mo.
App. 1946) (Court declared that an expelled member "has a right to be heard...
on the question where unauthorized persons have usurped control of the church
tribunal" and where specific church procedures regarding procedures such as no-
tice have not been observed. Id. at 646). In David v. Carter, 222 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949), the court found a "radical departure from accepted customs and
rules of organization" when it reviewed the expulsion of a member without previ-
ous notice of the time, place, and purpose of the meeting. Id. at 906. In Taylor v.
Jackson, 273 F. 345 (D.C. 1921) (Baptist church), the court reversed several ex-
pulsions based on insufficiency of notice and service of copy of charges as required
by the rules of the denomination. In Longmeyer v. Payne, 205 S.W.2d 263 (Mo.
App. 1947), the court reversed expulsions where there was no notice or opportu-
nity to be heard as required by church rules. In Randolph v. First Baptist Church,
53 Ohio Op. 288, 120 N.E.2d 485 (1954), the court invalidated an expulsion since
the pastor, in announcing a meeting to deal with members who had opposed the
advancement of the church's program, had failed to note that plaintiff was the
one referred to; and plaintiff had not been given notice of the charges against her
before the trial. The court noted that, although a church is autonomous and the
minority must submit to the majority, it does not follow that the church can expel
members with utter disregard of constitutional provisions regarding expulsion of
members. Id. at 497.
115. Brown v. Mt. Olive Baptist Church, 255 Iowa 857, 124 N.W.2d 445
(1963). Courts have traditionally been reluctant, however, to interfere even when
there are irregularities. In Mt. Olive Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick, 252 Ala.
672, 42 So. 2d 617 (1949), the Alabama Supreme Court refused to intervene in a
dismissal of members without notice, arguing that to do so would be "treading on
[Vol. 10:1
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When the church has, at most, minimal formal procedures, the
disgruntled parties usually allege that the procedures were im-
proper because of their basic unfairness, or "natural justice." In
Rock Dell Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Congregation v.
Mommsen,"6 the court held that an expulsion without any notice,
any formal charges, or any opportunity to be heard was void even
though the church's own rules had no requirements of notice or
hearings. Other jurisdictions have handed down similar decisions
based on concepts of natural justice." 7 These courts speak of a
presumption of such requirements." 8 Other courts reject the appli-
cation of any such natural justice concepts. " 9
Courts are reluctant, however, to inquire too deeply into the
procedural aspects of associational rights when they involve
churches because the constitutional protections of religion compli-
cate any judicial involvement. The Supreme Court in Watson'20
indicated its reluctance to review "with minuteness and care" the
most dangerous ground and invading a sanctuary." Id. at 619. The court con-
cluded that "the church being independent, and not subject to higher powers, and
being a law unto itself for its own procedures in religious matters, what it did
towards the expulsion of petitioner was not unlawful, even if it was not politic and
wise." Id.
116. 174 Minn. 207, 219 N.W. 88 (1928).
117. One aspect of natural justice concepts that the courts also raise is
whether or not one may challenge an expulsion on grounds of lack of good faith.
Brown v. Harris County Medical Soc'y, 194 S.W. 1179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), cit-
ing earlier cases on associational rights including religious groups, affirmed the
court for reviewing an expulsion to ascertain whether or not it was in good faith.
Other courts have rejected any "good faith" exception, suggesting they have no
jurisdiction to inquire into motives. See, e.g., Clapp v. Krug, 232 Ky. 303, 22
S.W.2d 1025 (1929).
118. See In re Koch, 257 N.Y. 318, 178 N.E. 545 (1931), holding a dismissal
void where no adequate notice or opportunity to be heard existed. In a few cases,
it has been alleged the by-laws themselves violated such principles of fairness. As
with general associational law, corporate by-laws of religious bodies will control
unless found to be "unreasonable, unadapted to the corporate purpose, or con-
trary or inconsistent with the laws of the state . . . ." See also Fairchild v. Tillot-
son, 118 Misc. 639, 195 N.Y.S. 39 (1922) (involving incorporated Christian Science
church).
119. Examples of churches specifically indicating they would not assess
whether an expulsion was violative of "natural justice" are Partin v. Tucker, 126
Fla. 817, 172 So. 89 (1937). Compare later Florida decision in First Free Will
Baptist Church, Inc. v. Franklin, 148 Fla. 277, 4 So. 2d 390 (1941), implying a
review for "arbitrariness" might be considered, with Minton v. Leavell, 297 S.W.
615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
120. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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usages, customs, laws, and organizations of religious denominations
and thereby interfere with the rights and processes of such bodies
in "construing their own church laws."12 ' A further basis for such a
reluctance to intervene is the court's lack of special knowledge of
ecclesiastical matters. The ecclesiastical bodies themselves are the
"best judges of their own law." '22
A few courts suggest that they would not review a church deci-
sion about membership on any grounds. In early cases, courts
often applied a rule that prevented review of any expulsion unless
some property or civil right was involved. 23 Because most courts
did not find a right in mere membership, they declined to inter-
fere. Such a rule led to a "hands off" posture rendering some un-
usual decisions, such as in Jenkins v. New Shiloh Baptist
Church. 24
B. Claims Grounded in Defamation
"'It seems to me that you have played a con game with Mrs.
Youngblood and that is what I call you is a Con-Man'; 'You have
crooked ways,'" insisted board member C.G. Weeks to Rev. W.D.
Joiner when the thirteen members of the Louisiana District Board
of the United Pentecostal Church met to hear the allegations of
misconduct brought by Rev. Ora Cripps Youngblood against Rev.
121. Id. at 733.
122. Numerous cases make this point. See Morris Street Baptist Church v.
Dart, 67 S.C. 338, 45 S.E. 753 (1903).
123. Courts are divided on whether membership itself is such a right. The
majority rule seems to be that it is not, although Texas and Nebraska courts have
found that it is at least a "valuable right" and have intervened. Where, of course,
the case also raises issues of rights to property or income, the "property or civil
right" requirement is easily met.
124. 189 Md. 512, 56 A.2d 788 (1948). The church's constitution and book of
discipline established various rules for church discipline actions. Yet the church
ignored these provisions which included a requirement of an initial review of any
contemplated discipline by pastors and deacons. The church did not provide no-
tice of a pending expulsion action at a called meeting or opportunity for the
plaintiff to be heard, and even non-members were allowed to vote. This violated
the church's own rules. Yet the court still declined to interfere. Similarly, in Murr
v. Maxwell, 232 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. App. 1950), the court refused to intervene in
spite of allegations that procedures for calling proper business meetings were not
followed, no testimony was received, and Matthew 18 was not observed. Hundley
v. Collins, 131 Ala. 234, 243, 32 S. 575, 578 (1902) (warning interference would
"open a door to untold evils" and deference is "consistent with principles of reli-
gious freedom").
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Joiner concerning his business transactions with her. 2 ' The board
passed a resolution noting that the conduct of Joiner was "not
right legally, morally or as a Christian and certainly not as a minis-
ter."12 They called on him to apologize for his actions; but, given
his failure to do so and his disrespect for the board, they recom-
mended that Rev. Joiner "be dropped from the ministerial fellow-
ship of the United Pentecostal Church."'1 27 Rev. Joiner responded
by suing the thirteen members of the board for their action, alleg-
ing defamation. He also sued members of the board, including
Weeks, for statements made at the meeting. 128
This case illustrates the potential for lawsuits against churches
and church leaders in church discipline contexts based not on a
challenge to the power of the church to dismiss its members but
rather on an allegation that in dismissing its member the church
and its leaders defamed the disciplined person. 12 The most com-
mon tort actions in church discipline contexts are for libel or slan-
der. Certainly many of the charges against persons in church disci-
pline situations are damaging to their reputation and create the
basis for the allegation of defamation during the course of the
church discipline.130
C. Limits on Defamation Actions
In addition to assertions of plaintiff's failure to prove the nec-
essary elements such as "publication"' 3' or reputational injury, two
125. Joiner v. Weeks, 383 So. 2d 101, 103-04 (La. App. 1980).
126. Id. at 103.
127. Id. at 101.
128. Id.
129. The plaintiff, if successful, will not be reinstated but will obtain a
money judgment against the defendants who were directly involved in the defam-
atory communications (i.e., the persons who initiated the false charges or falsely
testified). See Swafford v. Keaton, 29 Ga. App. 13, 113 S.E. 67 (1922); Whitaker v.
Carter, 26 N.C. 461 (1844); and Dial v. Holter, 6 Ohio St. 228 (1856), in which the
court rendered judgments against church members who brought false charges or
were witnesses who falsely testified at expulsion trials or before investigators.
130. See Servatius v. Pichel, 34 Wis. 292 (1874).
131. The issue of whether there was "publication" is at issue in Guinn as
well. The appellant's brief before the Oklahoma Supreme Court for the Collins-
ville Church of Christ argues that no publication of the statements was made on
which to find an invasion of privacy. Counsel cited an early Missouri defamation
case in which the court held there to be no publication when the pastor in church
services read resolutions excommunicating a member and also made the resolu-
tions available to church members. The Missouri court held that such communi-
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"affirmative defenses" are important in church discipline defama-
tion cases: the defenses of truth and qualified privilege. The de-
fense of truth is absolute and creates substantial obstacles for liti-
gants in actions arising out of church discipline contexts. The
defense of truth curtails most suits arising out of church discipline
contexts. Even where the charges prove to be false, the qualified
privilege defense proves to be a significant limit on defamation
claims. The privilege protects, under certain circumstances and be-
tween certain parties, defamatory statements. The scope of the
qualified privilege outside the defamation context was a crucial is-
sue in Guinn.
One frequently cited explanation of the scope of a qualified
privilege in defamation notes the kinds of communications pro-
tected by this privilege as:
communications made in good faith upon any subject matter in
which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to
which he has a duty to a person having a corresponding interest
of duty, although the duty be not a legal one, but of a moral or
social character . . . and it arises from the necessity of full and
unrestricted communication concerning a matter in which the
parties have an interest or duty."3 2
This definition embodies three critical elements: 1) good faith; 2) a
legitimate interest or duty on the part of the communicator (the
"duty" may be either legal or moral in nature); and 3) communica-
tion to one with a similar interest or duty. This qualified privilege
is commonly found in communications between an employer and
employee related to job responsibilities or among members of fra-
ternal associations and labor organizations.133
cations did not constitute "publication within the meaning of defamation law."
Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433 (1833).
132. Southern Ice Co. v. Black, 136 Tenn. 391, 189 S.W. 861, 863 (1916). See
33 AM. JUR. Libel and Slander § 126 (1941). Oklahoma law would appear to con-
cur. In Tuohy v. Halsell, 128 P. 126 (Okla. 1912), the Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that a qualified privilege "extends to all communications made bona fide
upon a subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in
reference to which he has a duty to a person having a corresponding interest or
duty, and to cases where the duty is not a legal one, but where it is of a moral or
social character or imperfect obligation." Id. at 128. For a similar North Carolina
rule, see Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962).
133. See Jones, Interest and Duty in Relation to Qualified Privilege, 22
MICH. L. REv. 441-44 (1924).
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In Joiner v. Weeks,"" the court articulated the privilege and
its rationale.
[The qualified privilege] arises from the social necessity of per-
mitting full and unrestricted communication concerning a matter
in which the parties have an interest or duty, without inhibiting
free communication in such instances by the fear that the com-
municating party will be held liable in damages if the good faith
communication turns out to be inaccurate.
Courts have recognized a qualified privilege in the context of
church discipline proceedings. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
notes common interests as they apply to religious groups.
The common interest of members of religious, charitable or
other non-profit associations ... is recognized as sufficient to
support a privilege for communication among themselves con-
cerning the qualifications of the officers and members and their
participation in the activities of the society. This is true whether
the defamatory matter relates to alleged misconduct of some
other member that makes him undesirable for continued mem-
bership, or the conduct of a prospective member ...."'
One California case illustrates both the scope of the privilege and
its limits.1 36 Rev. A.L. Brewer and E.W. Fisher brought an action
for libel against the Second Baptist Church of Los Angeles, the
pastor, and the chairman and secretary of the deacons. Brewer and
others previously unsuccessfully sued the church to have an elec-
tion set aside. The deacons and the pastor, upset with this, then
voted to expel Brewer and his co-plaintiff from the church for their
involvement in the lawsuit against the church. Two of the defend-
ants drew up charges. The statement of charges noted the "vile
spirit and utter disrespect for leadership" on the part of Brewer.1 31
It further stated that the plaintiffs "hurt the prestige and good
name of the church" and concluded: "We finally charge that both
134. Joiner v. Weeks, 383 So. 2d 101, 106 (1980), citing Toomer v. Breaux,
146 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 1962). RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 592 (1977)
also speaks of the public policy behind a qualified privilege in order to assure the
flow of true information. (Is this a rationale, in a more limited forum, of the same
sort as in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), on the need to assure
"breathing space," an open forum for communication without the threat of chil-
ling civil penalties for mistake?)
135. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 596, comment e (1976).
136. Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948).
137. Id. at __, 197 P.2d at 715.
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of these men have by their unwarranted actions and downright
falsehood revealed themselves as totally unworthy of the continued
confidence, respect and fellowship of a great church which they
have so grievously wronged."13 Brewer and Fisher were advised of
the dismissal proceedings, and then the church voted to "withdraw
the hand of fellowship."I
39
The church issued a press release reporting the action and
provided an article on their actions for a newspaper, The National
Baptist Voice. The article stated that the judge found as false the
charges Brewer initially brought against the church in the dis-
missed lawsuit.140 Brewer and others then sued for defamation.
The court had no problem finding the language defamatory. In
fact, the court noted the "charges were designed to injure the
plaintiffs' reputations in the church and to cause them to be
shunned and avoided. 1
4 1
The court then considered the claim of the church that it had
a qualified privilege. The California Civil Code1 41 provided for such
a privilege in language similar to that cited above. In applying the
California rule, the court observed:
[O]rdinarily, the common interest of the members of a
church in church matters is sufficient to give rise to a qualified
privilege to communications between members on subjects relat-
ing to the church's interest . . .A privilege would exist ... if the
publication had been made without malice and the occasion had
not been abused.1 43
The court proceeded to note, however, that this privilege could
be lost in several ways: "[1] by the publisher's lack of belief, or of
reasonable grounds for belief, in the truth of the defamatory mate-
rial, [2] by excessive publication, [3] by . . .an improper purpose,
or [4] if the defendant goes beyond the group interest." " In re-
viewing the development of the congregation's disputes, the court
found "ample evidence in the record" to support the inference of
ill will and malice by Pastor Henderson.1 4 5 The qualified privilege
138. Id. at _ , 197 P.2d at 716.
139. Id.
140. Id. The court dismissed plaintiffs' suit not because the charges were
false but on other grounds, and therefore truth was not available as a defense.
141. Id. at __, 197 P.2d at 717.
142. CAL. CIv. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982).
143. Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d at 791, 197 P.2d at 717.
144. Id. at _ , 197 P.2d at 717 (numbers added).
145. Id.
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was lost, and the defendants were liable. The qualified privilege
did not, the court concluded, give a "license to overdraw, exagger-
ate, or to color the facts."""6
Brewer illustrates the requirement of "good faith." The privi-
lege is lost if the defamer acts maliciously. The Brewer court spoke
of a motivation by any cause other than the desire to carry out
church discipline in good faith. Certainly the parties must have, in
regard to their statements, a reasonable belief in their truth.14 7
Cases also speak of ill will and an intention to injure the plaintiff
in his profession, or an intention to injure the plaintiff's feelings
and reputation.1 8 Courts also take note of such factors as the gen-
eral tenor of the charges, coloring or exaggerating the facts, failure
to state facts fully, vilification or extravagant language, and com-
plete lack of knowledge of facts of a signed statement." 9
In Joiner v. Weeks, 50 the issue also became one of whether a
qualified privilege existed or whether it was lost because of lack of
good faith. The court found that the meetings and proceedings of
the church officials were in good faith and without malice. Addi-
tionally, the court found that its meetings were limited to the
proper members of the board and its resolutions and discussions
were not circulated to anyone without a legitimate interest. 5 '
D. Is the Church a Legitimate Community of Interest?
The courts nearly universally hold that a legitimate common
interest exists within the church to carry out its affairs which in-
clude the discipline of its members. "It is hard to imagine a more
obvious example of common interest than that which is shared by
the members of a church,"' 52 observed a New Hampshire court.
But how broad is this community? Is it the whole church, or
only leaders? What about, as in Guinn, sharing information with
sister churches? Or publishing it in a newsletter? Such questions
raise not simply legal issues but theological ones as well. It is possi-
146. Id. at __, 197 P.2d at 719.
147. Id. at , 197 P.2d at 717.
148. Id.
149. Id. at __, 197 P.2d at 719.
150. 383 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 1980).
151. Citing Carter v. Catfish Cabin, 316 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 1975), citing
Madison v. Bolton, 234 La. 997, 102 So. 2d 433 (1958). See also Bush v. Carrieri,
69 Wash. 2d 536, 540, 419 P.2d 132, 137 (1966), insisting that "good faith and
reasonable conduct" are the touchstones of "any qualified privilege."
152. Slocinski v. Radwan, 83 N.H. 501, 144 A. 787, 789 (1929).
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ble to answer such questions only by entering the "dismal swamp"
in order to understand and apply the governing structures and pol-
ity of the religious body. 15 3
What sort of information is of "legitimate common interest"?
Again the question raises legal questions with theological over-
tones. Differences in church governance may well confuse courts
unfamiliar with church structures and the theological convictions
that may underpin them.
While the case law is generally old, the pattern seems to be to
extend the privilege, once it is established, to a fairly broad range
of communications and communicants. A frequently cited older
case suggests that the privilege protects persons bringing charges,
testifying, voting, or announcing a result if it is all in good faith
and within the authority of the church.15 Other cases hold that
the privilege covers the words of a presiding officer within his line
of duty, if he uttered them believing their truth and from a sense
of duty,155 and the words of members of church tribunals investi-
gating charges.15 6 One court held privileged the publication of
charges in a denominational journal due to common interest, and
the privilege was not lost by incidentally coming to the attention of
non-members. 57 The privilege also covers recommendations by in-
vestigatory panels, 158 a pastor's reading of the sentence of expul-
sion to congregation,1 59 a church member's charge with honest in-
153. Most religious groups arguably could ascertain the relevant body for
church disciplinary procedures by applying neutral principles of law and review-
ing church constitutions, bylaws, and prior practices. For example, in congrega-
tional churches such as the Church of Christ, ultimate authority may rest in the
total congregation rather than an elected administrative unit such as a board of
trustees or elders or presbyters who may have such authority in other church
governance.
154. Farnsworth v. Storrs, - Mass. (5 Cush.) 412 (1850), cited in Kleizer
v. Symmes, 40 Ind. 562 (1872); Butterworth v. Todd, 76 N.J.L. 317, 70 A. 139
(N.J. 1908); Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 501, 31 Am. Rep. 698 (1879); and Serva-
tius v. Pichel, 34 Wis. 292 (1874).
155. Anderson v. Maim, 198 Ill. App. 58 (1916).
156. Kleizer v. Symmes, 40 Ind. 562 (1872).
157. Redgate v. Roush, 61 Kan. 480, 59 P. 1050 (1900); and Moyle v. Frantz,
267 App. Div. 423, 46 N.Y.S. 2d 667, aff'd 293 N.Y. 842, 59 N.E.2d 437 (1944)
(Privilege remains intact so long as publication circulation limited to those inter-
ested in the affairs of the organization.).
158. Lucas v. Case, - Ky. (9 Bush) 297 (1872); Bass v. Matthews, 69
Wash. 214, 124 P. 384 (1912).
159. Farnsworth v. Storrs, - Mass. (5 Cush.) 412 (1850).
[Vol. 10:1
34
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss1/1
SCARLET LETTER LAWSUITS
tention of examining fitness for membership, 6 ' and church
members' letters to church officials with authority to act (such as
to a bishop concerning a priest or to church deacons regarding the
pastor or his wife). 6 '
These decisions seem to rest on the relationship of the com-
munications to the regular or official administrative structures, sys-
tems, and bodies within the church that have duties in regard to
investigation or discipline." 2 In these cases, the "duty" is clearer,
because it rests not simply on common interest but on identified
responsibilities and structures. A few decisions apply the privilege
when it is outside the normal, official disciplinary structures or
procedures of the church, such as when church members discuss
among themselves charges against members or a pastor. If the pub-
lication goes beyond the local church itself, it may no longer be
privileged.'63 However, not all publication beyond the church is be-
yond the purview of the privilege."6
160. Jarvis v. Hatheway, 3 Johns. 180, 3 Am. Dec. 473 (N.Y. 1808).
161. O'Donaghue v. M'Govern, 23 Wend. 26 (N.Y. 1840); Lawless v. Ellis, 281
S.W. 1090 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
162. Applying such a rule, in congregational churches where ultimate author-
ity rests with the entire congregation, the whole church would have a legitimate
common interest in any information relevant to disciplinary action. In a church
with a governing board with final disciplinary authority, the community of inter-
est arguably might be more limited.
163. One court held that slanderous words about a clergyman to another cler-
gyman of the same denomination and to a church at which the slandered clergy-
man was preaching were not privileged even though the purpose was in the con-
text of a controversy about whether the church ought to employ the clergyman.
Ritchie v. Widdemer, 59 N.J.L. 290, 35 A. 825 (1896). Similarly, a letter by a
minister to another minister and a ministerial association stating that a certain
minister was unfit for the ministry was not privileged because the minister owed
no duty to the association and had no interest in the removal of the minister.
Shurtleff v. Parker, 130 Mass. 293 (1881). In Haynes v. Robertson, 190 Mo. App.
156, 175 S.W. 290 (1915), the court held that a member's slanderous statement
about a minister who preached in the church as an evangelist but was not then a
member or a pastor of the church was not privileged since there were no charges
then existing in the church regarding the minister in question. Id. at 159, 175
S.W. at 293. In another case when members of the same church discussed another
church member, the court held that there was no qualified privilege when no evi-
dence of a duty upon members to give information about each other's character
existed. Ballew v. Thompson, 259 S.W. 856, 857 (Mo. App. 1924).
164. In Redgate v. Rousch, 61 Kan. 480, 59 P. 1050 (1900), the elders of a
Church of Christ in Wilmington, Kansas, found their pastor unfit and unworthy
of his office. They published a notice in church papers distributed over a number
of midwestern states, noting the unfitness of their preacher, charging him with
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IV. CHURCH DISCIPLINE AND THE NEW TORTS
A. Church Discipline as Invasion of Privacy
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to the
Crown. It may be frail - its roof may leak - the wind may enter
- but the King of England cannot enter - all his force dares not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
- William Pitt 6 '
In church discipline cases where the allegations regarding the
plaintiff's conduct are true or in good faith, imaginative counsel
seek to surmount the barriers of the defenses of truth and qualified
privilege by bringing actions in the relatively new torts of invasion
of privacy and infliction of emotional distress. The scope of these
torts, the defenses to them, and the degree to which they are sub-
ject to free exercise and speech protective constitutional limits are
still largely unknown. Counsel for plaintiffs turn to these actions
hoping they can fit the facts within the developing principles of
these claims.
When Marian Guinn's lawyers filed their suit against the Col-
linsville Church of Christ, they asserted:
That on or about the 27th day of September, 1981, the Defend-
ants . . . give [sic] publicity to certain matters concerning the
"insubordination," and indicating they did not consider him "worthy of the confi-
dence of the brotherhood." Id. The Kansas Supreme Court held that "[i]f the
statements were published in good faith, and in what was honestly deemed to be
an official or moral duty toward other church members, and for the benefit and
protection of the church organization at large . . . it is privileged and protected."
Id. at 1050. The court concluded that "[i]f the plaintiff was unworthy. . . of his
high calling, the defendants, interested in the welfare of the denomination
throughout the land, would appear to have been justified in warning other mem-
bers and congregations . . . ." Id. at 1051. The fact that others might have inad-
vertently seen it did not destroy the privilege. Id. Similarly, the publication by an
association of ministers of their withdrawal of fellowship from a minister and a
requirement that he show cause why he should not be dismissed was privileged
even though it was in denominational papers reaching the general public. Shurt-
leff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 501 (1879). Similarly, one court held that the reading of the
charges to the whole congregation, even when non-members were present, was not
to be so broad as to destroy the privilege. Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433 (1883).
See also Herndon v. Melton, 249 N.C. 217, 105 S.E.2d 531 (1958) (Court granted
nonsuit because a church investigator's official report, published in the official or-
gan of the church, was qualifiedly privileged since there was no evidence of ex-
press or actual malice.).
165. Quoted in J. SHATTUCK, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY 1 (1983).
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private life of Plaintiff and did thereby invade her privacy ....
That said matters were publicized to the congregation, members
and attendants of the Church of Christ of Collinsville, Oklahoma.
That the publication . . . was highly offensive and was not of le-
gitimate concern to said persons or to the public. 68
Other church discipline suits have alleged similar invasions. 67
Did the Collinsville Church elders go beyond the realm of be-
ing moral guardians or "mere busybodies" into a legally cognizable
arena of wrongs for which the law ought to provide a remedy? Did
the congregation have no legitimate interest in the information dis-
closed to them?
1. The Legal Concept of Invasion of Privacy
Privacy may be an "imaginary luxury"' 6 8 in the modern world,
but it remains so highly prized that we agree that "without privacy
there is no individuality."1 69 The modern concept of invasion of
166. Amended complaint, Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, No. 81-
929 (Dist. Ct. Tulsa County, Okla. filed Nov. 23, 1981).
167. Guinn's attorney is not the only one to seek help in such allegations.
James Shive in his suit alleged that
the defendants . .. did give publicity to certain matters concerning the
private life of James L. Shive and did thereby invade his privacy [and]
that the publication ... is and was highly offensive and was not of legit-
imate concern to said persons or to the public . . . and not of public
record.
Shive v. Adkisson, No. 84 CV 6646 (Denver County Ct., Colo., Oct. 1983).
John Kelly alleged that the. defendants "invaded Plaintiff's privacy by intru-
sion into [his] private affairs, publicly disclosing embarrassing, intimate, and pri-
vate facts." Kelly v. Christian Community Church, No. 545117 (Super. Ct. Santa
Clara County, Cal. filed Mar. 22, 1984).
In a related, but not church discipline case, O'Neil v. Schuckhardt, 112 Idaho
472, 733 P.2d 693 (1986), the court upheld an invasion of privacy claim against
Fatima Crusade, a sect of the Latin Rite Church.
168. W. ZELERMYER, INVASION OF PRIVACY 25 (1956).
169. L. YOUNG, LIFE AMONG THE GIANTS 34 (1966), quoted in A. WESTIN, PRI-
VACY AND FREEDOM (1970). In a psychological sense, privacy is prized and essen-
tial. We all prize our individuality and privacy-our own zones of autonomy
which can shelter our "ultimate secrets." WESTIN at 33. Westin suggests that
the most serious threat to the individual's autonomy is the possibility
that someone may penetrate the inner zone and learn his ultimate secrets
... penetrat[ing] the individual's protective shell, his psychological ar-
mour, [which] would leave him naked to ridicule and shame and put him
under the control of those who knew his secrets . . . The individual's
sense that it is he who decides when to go 'public' is a crucial aspect of
his feeling of autonomy.
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privacy17 owes its life to a Harvard law review article in 1890,
which argued that there was a "right of privacy" which the law
ought to recognize - a right "not arising from contract" or notions
merely of private property but a right "as against the world."'
The authors insisted on the necessity of some protection of privacy
in the face of a press "overstepping. . . the obvious bounds of pro-
priety and decency" with unseemly gossip resulting "in a lowering
of social standards and of morality." '72 They concluded:
The principle which protected personal writings and all other
productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right of pri-
vacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate when it ex-
tends this protection to the personal appearance, sayings, acts
and to personal relation, domestic or otherwise.17 3
Though the article did not institute a complete and immediate
revolution, it was the foundation for legal thought that culminated
in both legislative and judicial creation of a right to privacy.1 7 To-
Id. at 34. That seeking privacy can be destructive is equally well recognized.
Karen Horney describes persons who seek an unnatural degree of privacy as one
of the three major types of neurotics in our society. K. HORNEY, OUR INNER CON-
FLICTS 76 (1959). See Fromm-Reighmann, Loneliness, 22 Psychiatry 2, 3 (1959).
170. Aspects of the legal protection of privacy have existed in western law
and in our constitutional system from its inception. Justice Joseph Story noted
that first amendment protections were intended to secure the rights of "private
sentiment" and "private Judgment." 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 591, 597, 600 (2d ed. 1851). The third amendment protects
persons from the quartering of troops in their homes without permission. The
object of the amendment was "to secure the perfect enjoyment of that great right
of the common law, that a man's house shall be his own castle, privileged against
all civil and military intrusion." Id. at 608. Early common law in America also
protected against eavesdropping. In 1831, a Pennsylvania judge, in upholding a
charge against a man who watched a married woman through the window in her
home and spread tales about her, commented: "Every man's house is his castle,
where no man has a right to intrude for any purpose whatever. No man has a
right to pry into your secrecy in your own house. . . our families should be sacred
from the intrusion of every person." Commonwealth v. Lovett, 4 Clark 5 (Pa.
1831).
171. S. Warren & L. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890). A Boston newspaper's report on Warren's wife's social activities appar-
ently stimulated the article.
172. Id. at 196.
173. Id. at 213.
174. In the first case after publication that tested the concept of "rights to
privacy," a New York court faced a suit by a girl whose picture had been used in
advertising without her permission. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171
N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). The trial court rendered a judgment for the girl, but
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day the law recognizes this right to privacy and provides a legal
civil remedy for its invasion. 171 Such a right extends to individuals
and, to some extent, to associations. 7  The Supreme Court in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut177 took an additional step in enunciating a
constitutional doctrine of a right to privacy. The Court asserted
that, under the fourteenth amendment's due process protections, a
right to privacy was a fundamental right.
the highest court in New York reversed, declaring that "there is no precedent for
such an action . . ." 64 N.E. at 443. The judge worried that, if such a principle
were permitted, "the attempts to logically apply the principle will necessarily re-
sult. . in litigation bordering on the absurd. . . ." Id. The court suggested that
if any such a right were to be asserted, it should come from the legislature. Id.
The New York legislature responded in 1903 by enacting the first law protecting
privacy, prohibiting for purposes of advertising or trade the use of any name, por-
trait, or picture of a living person without prior consent.
175. Courts, following an analysis by William Prosser, have identified four
types of such invasions of privacy that provide a legal remedy: 1) an unauthorized
appropriation of a person's name or likeness for commercial advantage; 2) acts of
intrusion into the privacy of one's affairs or seclusion in a way that would be
objectionable to a reasonable person; 3) putting a person into a false light; and 4)
public disclosure of private facts about a person. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383 (1960).
176. "[T]he interest protected by group privacy is the desire and need of
people to come together, to exchange information, share feelings, make plans and
act in concert to attain their objectives." E. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP
PRIVACY 125 (1978). The premise of giving up total privacy in the mutual sharing
of the group is the expectation that what is shared there is not public. Such pro-
tections of group privacy may have very important implications for religious lib-
erty. Protections of group privacy, including their mail lists and memberships,
have been subject to several court tests. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958), the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama statute that required the
NAACP to provide the state with a list of its members, noting the potential for
reprisals and "manifestations of public hostility." Id. at 462. In Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court noted that "compelled disclosure . . . [of member-
ships] can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by
the First Amendment." Id. at 64.
177. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court held that a Connecticut law forbidding
the distribution of birth control information was a violation of a right to marital
privacy. The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Douglas, spoke of zones of
privacy created by various constitutional concepts. Id. at 485. Justice Goldberg
declared that the right of privacy was "so rooted [in the traditions and conscience
of our people] as to be ranked as fundamental" and insisted privacy was a
fundamendal personal liberty "retained by the people." Id. at 493, 499 (Goldberg,
J., concurring), quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1933). Justice
Stewart in his dissent agreed that the Connecticut law was "uncommonly silly"
but declared he could "find no such general right of privacy" in the Constitution
or prior decisions. Id. at 527, 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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In church discipline cases, the primary issue is whether the
public disclosure of private facts constitutes an invasion of pri-
vacy." 8 The Restatement on the Law of Torts, § 652 D, adopted
by Oklahoma,179 summarizes the law:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his pri-
vacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. 180
Church discipline claims asserting invasion of privacy often, as
in Guinn, additionally assert that the information disclosed was
subject to an obligation of confidentiality. The assertion of a
breach of confidentiality raises a separate, though related, tort
claim from invasion of privacy, because it is grounded in a negli-
gence type breach of duty action. The plaintiffs asserted that the
disclosure was wrongful because of the duty owed the plaintiffs,
not because it revealed highly offensive private facts of no legiti-
mate public interest. Such claims often emerge from the context of
pastoral counseling which, as in Kelly v. Christian Community
Church1 81 and in Roberson v. Evangelical Orthodox Church,"8 2 was
the alleged source of the information later revealed in church disci-
plinary proceedings. Where the only source of information later re-
vealed in disciplinary proceedings was obtained in contexts where
there were expectations of confidentiality, it does pose special
problems. 8" Where, however, as in Guinn, the information is not
exclusively available through communications subject to confiden-
tiality, then a claim grounded in breach of a duty to maintain con-
178. Conceivably the intrusive type could also be an issue where church offi-
cials were investigating conduct, and it could emerge that a church in its publica-
tion created an impression which was false and objectionable.
179. McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 613 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1980);
Munley v. ISC Fin. House, Inc., 584 P.2d 1336 (Okla. 1978).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 D (1977).
181. No. 545117 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, Cal. filed Mar. 22, 1984).
182. No. 981129 (Super. Ct. Santa Cruz County, Cal. filed Oct. 15, 1984).
183. Usual expectations of privacy in pastoral counseling settings might be
overcome by clear notice and contrary practices that gave effective notice that not
all communications would be accorded an absolute privilege. Some who insist bib-
lical principles of church discipline require that, in the case of unrepentant per-
sons, Matthew 18 will be followed in its command to "tell it to the church" and
suggest such notice and practice.
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fidences should not be entertained.
184
2. Defenses Grounded in Challenging Plaintiff's Proof of
Elements
In cases such as Guinn, defendants may well seek to demon-
strate that plaintiffs did not show the requisite elements of the ac-
tion. First, one can argue that, in Guinn, the facts revealed were
public, not private, and that the church congregation was told
nothing about Ms. Guinn that was not already public. Thus, there
was no disclosure of private facts. Where the disclosure is about
facts no longer private, there is no liability. "Therefore, to
whatever degree and in whatever connection a man's life has
ceased to be private . . . to that extent the protections of the right
of privacy is withdrawn."'185
Further, one might wonder whether in Guinn there was any
public disclosure. Is there "public disclosure" in the limited dis-
closure to a church governing body? In the defamation contexts,
some older cases held that there was no publication within the
meaning of defamation law when information was conveyed only to
the congregation. ' 6 In Guinn, the church did not hold press con-
ferences, issue general news releases, or expose Marian's story to
the world. It is unclear whether information shared within an asso-
ciational or church body is public. Indeed, at least in some cases
184. While expectations of confidentiality may be relevant in assessing inva-
sion of privacy-type claims, it is not clear that in such contexts duties of pastors
and church officials would not ever justify a disclosure of information obtained.
Courts have held that duties may arise requiring disclosure of information where
there are serious risks of harm to third persons. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents, 17
Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334 (1976); cf Bellah v. Greenson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 614; 146
Cal. Rptr. 535 (1978). In some situations, statutory duties may overcome confi-
dentiality obligations, e.g., child abuse reporting statutes. Fiduciary duties to the
church itself may in some circumstances warrant limited disclosure. See discus-
sion in Illman, Confidentiality and the Law: The Church's Right to Discipline, 26
PRESBYTERIAN JOURNAL, Dec. 1984, 9; W. TIEMANN AND J. BUSH, THE RIGHT TO
SILENCE (1983).
185. S. Warren and L. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
215 (1890). See, e.g., Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967
(D.C. Minn. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968); Raynor v. American Broad-
casting Co., 222 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40
Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953); Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d
304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939); Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496
(1966).
186. Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433 (1833).
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where officials have sought information from associations, the asso-
ciation's right to withhold the information was protected in part
because it was no longer public.187 Associational communications
and records, especially in associations marked by what Justice
Brennan described as "intimacy," would not normally be perceived
as public. 88
However, if the court finds the requisite disclosure to the pub-
lic of private facts, whether any communication to the congrega-
tion or other appropriate governing church body is nevertheless
privileged depends to a large extent on whether a qualified privi-
lege applies in invasion of privacy actions and what persons would
be included within it.
In Guinn, two special factors produced additional privacy ar-
guments. First, the plaintiff contended that whatever rights the
church may have had to communicate information relevant to
Marian's membership status were lost when she resigned, and any
subsequent revelation was no longer protected and thus actionable
as an invasion of privacy. Second, the complaint asserted that the
revelation of the information to the sister churches was an un-
privileged disclosure.189
3. Is There a Qualified Privilege of Community of Legiti-
mate Interest?
One of the most controverted aspects of Guinn is whether
under Oklahoma law there exists a qualified privilege applicable to
the communication of private facts similar to the privilege applica-
ble in defamation actions. When the communication is in good
faith, without actual malice, and between persons with a legitimate
187. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976).
188. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
189. Whether the disclosure of information to other churches regarding Ms.,
Guinn establishes an invasion of privacy depends on the same analysis as in the
local church. If the qualified privilege applies, then the issue becomes whether
there was a duty as between the communicants in regard to the information dis-
closed. In Redgate v. Rousch, 61 Kan. 480, 59 P. 1050 (1900), the Kansas Supreme
Court held that defamatory statements printed in a church newspaper were pro-
tected by the qualified privilege "if published in good faith, and in what was hon-
estly deemed to be an official or moral duty toward other church members, and
for the benefit and protection of the church at large." Id. at 1050. A Vermont
court held similarly when the withdrawal of fellowship from a minister was pub-
lished in denominational papers reaching the general public. Shurtless v. Stevens,
51 Vt. 501, 31 Am. Rep. 698 (1879).
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interest arising out of a duty or obligation, the communication is
protected even if absent the privilege it would be actionable as an
invasion of privacy. 9 '
Some states hold that such a privilege does exist. In Munsell
v. Ideal Food Stores,'91 the Kansas Supreme Court accepted the
rule that "the right of privacy does not prohibit the communica-
tion of any matter though of a private nature, when the publica-
tion is made under circumstances which would render it a privi-
leged communication according to the law of libel and slander. '1 92
In a subsequent case, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded:
Concerning an action for invasion of privacy, based upon the
communications of matters of a private nature, Munsell settled
these principles-(1) a warranted invasion of privacy is not ac-
tionable, (2) communication or publication of a matter even of a
private nature made under circumstances which would render it
a privileged communication according to the law of libel and
slander, will not support an action; and (3) generally, the issue
whether a publication is qualifiedly privileged is a question of law
to be determined by the court. 93
Such a rule serves the public policy interests that led to its
application in defamation contexts. If, under defamation law, good
faith communications between persons with a legitimate interest
are privileged, regardless of their truth, it seems incongruous to
give them less protection when they are truthful and accurate.'94
The policy reasons for recognizing that, first, information is essen-
tial among communities of interest, and that, second, such persons
should not be intimidated in sharing relevant information because
190. Plaintiff's counsel argued in Guinn that the Oklahoma court should not
recognize such a privilege and sought to discount cases relied on by the defend-
ants. "The 'qualified privilege' of libel and slander should not be applied to the
very different tort of invasion of privacy." Plaintiff's Brief in Response to Defend-
ant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ (filed
Aug. 27, 1982).
191. 208 Kan. 909, 494 P.2d 1063 (1972).
192. Id. at 1075.
193. Senogles v. Security Benefit Life Ins. Co., 217 Kan. 438, 536 P.2d 1358
(1975) (emphasis added).
194. Professor James McGoldrick suggested that the church might have been
better off if it had made a clearly false statement about Guinn instead of a true
one because the common law and constitutional limits of defamation actions are
much clearer than the elusive torts of invasion of privacy and emotional distress.
Telephone interview with James McGoldrick, Professor of Law, Pepperdine Uni-
versity School of Law.
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of fear of civil tort liability, apply more so to privacy claims involv-
ing truthful revelations than to defamation actions. If the privilege
does not apply under such circumstances, then good faith and ac-
curate statements in disciplinary proceedings in all kinds of orga-
nizations will be conducted only at the risk of financial destruction
of the association and its leadership.
The qualified privilege rests on two requirements. First, the
parties must be proper, both having a legitimate interest resting on
a duty (official or moral) in relation to the information. Second,
focusing on the information itself, the information must be rele-
vant to the interest or duty of the parties. Surely, the legitimacy of
this communication is clear when the information is true.
The qualified privilege should most clearly apply in church
discipline cases when the parties have a voluntary associational re-
lationship, especially when the persons to whom the private infor-
mation is revealed have associational duties of administering disci-
pline in the association, and the information is relevant to such
discipline as established by the church's own internal decisions. In
Guinn, because the congregation was the highest church authority
responsible for membership decisions, the revelation was not more
extensive than required by those who had duties established by
internal governance for such decisions. The qualified privilege in
associational contexts has additional force and appropriateness be-
cause the "legitimate interest" aspect would seem to be buttressed
by associational concepts of consent and waiver.
4. The Relevance of Resignation for Invasion of Privacy De-
fenses
"I do not want my name mentioned before the Church except
to tell them that I withdraw my membership immediately
.... -195 Marian Guinn made this statement in a letter to the
church on September 24, 1981, a few days before the church read
its letter to the congregation on October 4, 1981, and took discipli-
nary action in withdrawing fellowship from her. The Guinn case's
key legal issue on appeal may well be the legal relevance of her
resignation. Courts may apply traditional associational rights prin-
ciples to sustain broad rights of churches to practice church disci-
pline consistent with their own rules and procedures among mem-
bers. Courts, however, may be tempted to find that the resignation
195. Letter of Marian Guinn to Collinsville Church of Christ, Sept. 24, 1981.
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of a member bars the church from any further disciplinary action
because the basis for consent upon which such disciplinary rights
of the association/church rest no longer exists. Some commentators
take such a position. 196 Indeed, the attorney for Marian Guinn
argued:
[Pjlaintiff admits that within the context of church discipline, it
may be possible for those in authority to carry on sufficient con-
versation to discipline the members according to the rules of the
organization. However, plaintiff submits to the court that she was
entitled to cease to associate with the organization; that she did
so cease; and that any right which the members of said organiza-
tion had to gossip about her and make known matters of her pri-
vate life was thereby lost . . . .Any subsequent publication of
private matters regarding [Marian Guinn] after the withdrawal
were not privileged and were subject to action for invasion of
privacy. 9'
Marian had the right to withdraw her formal membership, and
the withdrawal of membership was effective immediately upon no-
tice to the church. 198 One may not be compelled to belong to a
voluntary association. The judge in Guinn so instructed the jury.
"You are instructed under the law, the plaintiff had the right to
terminate her membership with the church upon communication
of that fact to an authorized representative of the church at any
time."' 99
196. Ronald Flowers, grounding his perspective in voluntary associational
concepts, declared: "They can discipline whoever is still within their fellowship.
But they cannot discipline one who is no longer a member of their church." Flow-
ers, Can Churches Discipline Their Members, 27 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE
483, 497 (1985). See also Comment, Religious Torts: Applying the Consent Doc-
trine as Definitional Balancing, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 949 (1985) ("the consent-
based standard also should not apply to tortious acts committed by a religious
group after a member withdraws from the group").
197. Plaintiff's Brief in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, Guinn v. Collinsville Church of Christ (filed Aug. 27, 1982) at 9.
198. The church asserted a theological belief that one could not unilaterally
withdraw from the church. That belief may have some legal relevance in assessing
its internal responses to Marian's withdrawal and justify the church's feeling that
the matter had not been fully concluded. However, it does not bind Marian's legal
relationship to the church.
199. The judge in Guinn seemed to give some special significance to the res-
ignation as if it were a key element in assessing liability, and yet neither he nor
the jury limited damages to events after the resignation. If Marian's resignation
were the decisive point after which the privilege to disclose private facts was lost,
then presumably damages would be appropriate only for invasions of privacy or
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This instruction is consistent with associational law which pro-
vides for such unilateral resignation"' effective immediately with-
out any required action by the association.21 An association may
set forth reasonable procedures governing the manner of resigna-
tion or withdrawal. However, associations may not create by-laws
that allow associations to deny or reject attempted resignations ei-
ther by affirmative rejection or refusal to act on a letter of resigna-
tion. Such provisions are invalid on the grounds that they are un-
reasonable and arbitrary.20 2 However, a member's right to resign
and the fact of resignation ought not to end the inquiry into the
rights of the church to carry out its own internal administrative,
disciplinary, and educative processes. The legitimacy of the
church's continued disciplinary procedures is grounded in several
factors.
First, the church has rights independent of a member's rights;
merely because a member resigns, the church should not be totally
barred from carrying out its own internal processes for "withdraw-
ing fellowship" from the spiritual community. The church's inter-
nal, theologically grounded procedures for terminating a member's
relationship are important associational and religious rights that
should not be summarily suspended by a member's withdrawal.
The church must take a variety of steps when a member resigns.
Some of these steps are administrative, but others may relate to
theological and religious traditions that formalize the withdrawal.
other tortious acts after the resignation-but no such limits were imposed on the
jury.
200. See, e.g., Trustees of Pencader Presbyterian Church v. Gibson, 22 A.2d
782 (Del. 1941); Church of God v. Finney, 344 Ill. App. 598, 101 N.E.2d 856
(1951); Fuchs v. Meisel, 102 Mich. 357, 60 N.W. 773 (1894). In Gibson, the court
stated that "it is incontestable so far as the individual defendants are concerned.
Their right, individually or collectively, to withdraw themselves from the Parent
Church is protected to the fullest extent by the Constitution of this State." Gib-
son at 790; Katz v. Singerman, 241 La. 103, 127 So. 2d 515 (1961). In Brady v.
Reiner, 157 W. Va. 10, 198 S.E.2d 812 (1973), "[t]he Civil Courts freely recognize
and affirm the right of any individual or group to leave, abandon or separate from
membership in a church." Id. at 845. Interestingly, one court upheld a profes-
sional society's bylaw regulation that a resignation made when the person was
under charges was not effective. Ewald v. Medical Soc'y, 144 App. Div. 82, 128
N.Y.S. 886 (1911).
201. People ex rel: Haas v. New York Motor Club, 70 Misc. 603, 129 N.Y.S.
365, 368 (1911).
202. ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER, NEWLY REVISED § 60 (1981) does suggest,
however, that an association does not have an obligation to accept a resignation
from a member when the member is in the midst of a disciplinary proceeding.
[Vol. 10:1
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In some religious traditions, there may be ceremonies which sym-
bolize the community's sense of loss or tragedy.
To hold that the resignation bars further comment within an
association regarding its relationship to the resigned member could
produce bizarre results. Would not the Pope be surprised to learn
that after Henry VIII resigned from the church the Pope was
barred from commenting on or excommunicating Henry for his
adulterous affair? Would it not seem strange to contend that the
California Bar Association was barred from taking further discipli-
nary action or expressing its views on Nixon's conduct merely be-
cause he had resigned from the Bar before they had an opportu-
nity to issue statements or take formal action? Should the Boy
Scouts be precluded from advising council leaders regarding a
troop leader who had been caught in immoral conduct merely be-
cause, having been found out, the scout leader resigned a few hours
before the scheduled meeting? Do remaining members of an asso-
ciation have a legitimate need for information clarifying the reason
for the departure or the nature of their relationship with the for-
mer member?
Part of the confusion regarding the legitimacy of church disci-
plinary proceedings in the context of a withdrawn member results
from essentially theological misunderstandings about the purposes
and functions of church disciplinary practices. The biblical basis
for discipline is not exclusively oriented toward the disciplined
party. Church discipline is not simply a process of expulsion of un-
wanted members. If that was all that was involved, then indeed a
nice, quiet resignation would seem adequate, and all else might be
labeled as sheer spite. But the disciplined person is not the only
actor or focus. In fact, often a person under discipline will remove
himself or herself from direct contact with the church. What is
said to the congregation or elders is not chiefly for the disciplined
party but for those who remain. Of course, an aspect of discipline
is to encourage the sinner to face the consequences of his/her con-
duct and to invite repentance and restoration. However, it also
serves other purposes such as: 1) advising the members of what has
happened within their community in which they have a continuing
spiritual and communal investment; 2) identifying the responsibili-
ties and duties of the members toward the disciplined person, in-
cluding perhaps duties to pray for the other person, to encourage
them to amend their conduct, or, perhaps, in some cases, to avoid
certain dealings with them (e.g., shunning); and 3) reminding the
remaining members of the moral or theological commitments of
1987]
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the community and the consequences of those who choose to reject
those values and commitments. These are equally critical aspects
of church discipline that go beyond the formalities of dismissals
and expulsions.
Second, at least in contexts factually similar to Guinn, the
church or member may unilaterally terminate one's membership,
but termination may not easily extinguish the relationship and its
impact on the community. The relationship between the church
and a member was close and continuous. However, the pending
disciplinary procedures strained that relationship, and the member.
resigned. Must the church be silent about the events, legally lim-
ited to telling the governing officials of the church that she re-
signed? Certainly in any human or psychological sense, the resig-
nation in and of itself does not fully terminate all elements of the
relationship of that person's conduct to the community from which
he/she has resigned. Just as a dissolution of a corporation requires
certain acts to "wrap up" its affairs, so does the termination of a
membership relationship. Membership in a church community
often involves very close, perhaps intimate, relationships. Marian
Guinn's relationship to the Collinsville church had been such a re-
lationship. It would seem strange to suggest that the church must
in its formal acts nearly pretend that she did not exist. To do so
would be a serious denial of the character of a church community.
Third, consent principles may apply in sustaining the rights of
the church. To the extent that such procedures are a sort of "end-
ing" of the relationship and an aspect of regular membership ter-
mination procedures, it may be that the withdrawing member con-
sented to such associational practices when he or she joined. The
court acknowledged the incongruity of permitting a timely resigna-
tion to halt disciplinary processes in Ewald v. Medical Society.20 3
In Ewald, a society member sought to bar further disciplinary pro-
ceedings by resigning. The court held that such a resignation was
ineffective in the face of a bylaw of the society that required that
resignations be accepted and further provided that resignation
would not be effective for one "under charges." The court declared:
It seems plain, therefore, that a member on his admission to the
society assumes an obligation ... and that a breach of that obli-
gation in any respect involves a violation of duty to the society
.... The plaintiff agreed ... to submit to the discipline of the
Society for any act unfavorably 'affecting the character, dignity or
203. 44 App. Div. 82, 128 N.Y.S. 886.
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interest of the medical profession or of the Society.' The bylaws,
rules and regulations of the Society would have no sanction if its
discipline could be evaded by resignation. Whereupon it follows
• . . that the Society had the power to pass the by-law that no
member should be permitted to resign under charges.""
While consent has been withdrawn as to acts which might
compel the member to some action, it is uncertain that the with-
drawal of voluntary membership must, standing alone, negate a
prior consent to identify with an association that applied certain
procedures in withdrawing fellowship from members. This is espe-
cially clear in cases such as Guinn, where Marian voluntarily
joined a church that had a theology and practice that included
such convictions about membership. She should not be able to
complain about the processes of dealing with the termination of
members of an organization that she voluntarily joined. She argua-
bly waived a right to complain of practices to which she voluntarily
submitted.
Fourth, the particular facts in Guinn warrant the legitimacy of
the proceedings there, notwithstanding the resignation. When the
resignation occurs long before any contemplated church discipli-
nary action, the relationship may have become so negligible and
tenuous that statements in the church regarding the person's life
are no longer of any legitimate interest to the members. The mem-
bers may be curious, but the requisite relationship and impact
from the relationship that makes that interest legitimate are ab-
sent. Courts in such cases might find an invasion of privacy, a type
of intrusive meddling. That is hardly the case in Guinn or in most
church discipline cases.
In Guinn, the resignation occurred just days before the final
church action and long after the beginning of initial disciplinary
processes. Marian seemingly intended to preempt the pending dis-
cipline. Marian's resignation did not simply formalize the creation
of a non-relationship. Marian was an active member of the church,
and even in recent times, the relationship was persistent. Further-
more, in Guinn and similar situations, the actual conduct subject
to disclosure occurred during membership, not after resignation.
While this is not a conclusive factor, it supports the argument that
there may be a legitimate interest in such information and weak-
ens the argument that the resignation somehow bars any
disclosure.
204. Id. at -, 128 N.Y.S. at 891, 892. See supra note 202.
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The error of grounding the continuing disciplinary rights
solely in formal membership is the assumption that such church
rights rest solely on consent grounds. Consent is certainly relevant
and, where it exists, may be dispositive. It is not, however, the only
basis for rights to share information within a closed community. A
further basis of such rights is at the core of the qualified privilege
concept-relevant information and legitimate interest. Such con-
cepts are broader than consent. Here, the inquiry is not merely
whether the member or former member assented to any disclosure
but whether the disclosure is of legitimate interest to those persons
to whom communication is made because of some duty or responsi-
bility. Membership is not irrelevant to those issues of legitimacy of
interest and relevance of information, but it is not dispositive. It
may well affect the scope and nature of any disclosure but not to-
tally silence the church.
The law should recognize a continuing right of a church to en-
gage in limited disciplinary acts including the communication of
necessary and relevant facts because of the independent legitimate
interests of the remaining members. The key is whether there is a
legitimate interest that preserves the privilege to share private
facts in spite of the resignation. When assessing whether there is a
legitimate interest, a far more functional test than mere formal
membership is whether, weighing all the factors, the body from
which the party resigned has a continuing legitimate interest in the
information. Included among those factors are the following:
1. The nature of the present relationships between the person and
the church, including any resignation, its timing, and the prior
nature of relationships that affect the present associational and
religious interests;
2. the nature of the conduct that was the occasion of the disci-
pline and its present impact on the organization and/or its
members;
3. when the supposed private facts (usually conduct) took place
relative to the time of membership and resignation-that is,
whether the conduct occurred during the period in which there
was a clear privilege based on membership;
4. the necessity, for purposes of the internal affairs of the church,
both spiritual and administrative, for the persons to whom infor-
mation would be disclosed to be informed of otherwise private
facts; and
5. the actual or reasonable expectations regarding church discipli-
nary practices created by its doctrine and practice and the extent
of the disciplined person's implied or actual acceptance of those
[Vol. 10:1
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beliefs and practices by virtue of that person's membership status
and participation in the community.
The use of such a set of factors in assessing the scope of permissi-
ble disciplinary action, even where persons have resigned, will give
more appropriate recognition to the human realities of relation-
ships. The factors will also give appropriate weight to the legiti-
mate interests of the church and recognize the legal relevance of
the resignation on both the nature and the scope of any disclosure
of arguably private information.
B. Church Discipline as the Infliction of Emotional Distress
But what if, contrary to what is now so generally assumed, shame
is natural to man? ... What if it is shamelessness that is
unnatural... ?o1
A sense of shame is a lovely sign in a man. Whoever has a sense
of shame will not sin so quickly; but whoever shows no sense of
shame in his visage, his father surely never stood on Mount Sinai.
- Talmud2
If invasion of privacy claims seem amenable to use in church
discipline contexts, claims for infliction of emotional distress are
attractive for precisely the same reasons. Truth is no defense and
the tort's parameters are sufficiently ill-defined to enable the liti-
gator to attempt to bring a church discipline case within its orbit.
Marian Guinn's complaint alleged that "the publication of state-
ments about the plaintiff . . . was conduct which was and is ex-
treme and outrageous and which intentionally and recklessly
caused severe emotional distress to plaintiff."20 Guinn's progeny
similarly assert emotional distress claims.0 8
205. Berns, Pornography vs. Democracy-A Case for Censorship, 22 THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 44 (1971).
206. Quoted in C. SCHNEIDER, SHAME, EXPOSURE AND PRIVACY 109 (1977).
207. Guinn, No. C.T. 81-929 (Complaint filed Nov. 23, 1981) (emphasis
added).
208. James Shive's fourteenth claim for relief alleges that the publication
"was and is extreme and outrageous" (emphasis added here and in following ref-
erences in this footnote) which "intentionally and recklessly caused severe emo-
tional distress." John R. Kelly alleged the actions of the defendants "constitute
outrageous conduct which is not privileged and was likely to cause plaintiff emo-
tional distress." Charles Roberson complained that the actions of the defendants
"constitute outrageous conduct which is not privileged and was likely to cause
plaintiff emotional distress" and that the acts of defendants "were willful, fraud-
ulent, malicious, and oppressive, and . . . with the intent to vex, annoy, harass
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Courts have been slow to recognize claims for the infliction of
emotional distress because of concern over problems of proof of
emotional or mental distress and because of the dangers of mali-
cious and frivolous suits. Prosser endorsed early objections that the
tort was "too subtle and speculative" and failed to specify the
character of the injury.209 He observed that the action was "so eva-
nescent, intangible, peculiar and variable with the individual as to
be beyond prediction or anticipation. ' 210 As a Comment to the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts noted, "there is no occasion for the
law to intervene in every case where some one's feelings are
hurt."21
The case which "broke through the shackles of the older law"
was Wilkinson v. Downton, in which a practical joker told a wo-
man that her husband had been in an accident and broken both
legs.2 12 He told her that she was to go at once in a cab with two
pillows to bring him home. The shock to her nervous system pro-
duced serious and permanent physical consequences. In the light
of the facts of this case, "the enormity of the outrage overthrew
the settled rule of law." '213
Increasingly, courts provide remedies under certain narrow
conditions. Where the defendant's acts are so "outrageous" as to
overcome the reluctance to entertain such claims and the victim
suffered severe emotional distress, courts provide remedies.21 4
and injure plaintiff and in fact did cause plaintiff to suffer fright, nervousness,
grief, anxiety, embarrassment, apprehension, and terror . .. ."
209. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 42 (1956).
210. Id. at 42. An early influential article on the subject was Magruder,
Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033
(1936). It noted concern about opening up a wide vista of litigation in the field of
"bad manners."
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965). The
Oklahoma Supreme Court declared in Munley v. ISC Fin. House, Inc., that
"[tihere is simply no room in the framework of our society for permitting one
party to sue on the event of every intrusion into the psychic tranquility of an
individual." 584 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Okla. 1978).
212. Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B. 579 (1897).
213. Prosser, supra note 209.
214. The early cases finding liability for infliction of emotional distress illus-
trate the kind of conduct normally required: the decoying of a woman suspected
of insanity to a hospital by a concocted tale of an injured husband and child,
Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954); spreading false rumors of a
son's hanging himself, Bielitski v. Obadiak, 60 Dom. L. Rep. 494 (1921); bringing
a mob to the plaintiff's door with a threat to lynch him unless he left town, Wil-
son v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930); packaging and delivering a
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In Oklahoma, courts recognized a cause of action for infliction
of emotional distress.1 5 In Breeden v. League Services Corp.,21 6
the court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts' statement
of the law regarding the infliction of emotional distress which
states:
§ 46 Outrageous Conduct Causing Emotional Distress
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intention-
ally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm
to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
Comment d to that section provides in part:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go be-
yond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atro-
cious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally,
the case is one in which a recitation of the facts of an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment against
the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!'
217
gory dead rat instead of the loaf of bread a woman had ordered, Great A & P Tea
Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1930); and bullying a school girl with threats
of public disgrace and prison unless she signed a confession of immoral conduct,
Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926).
The courts also find liability in cases involving extreme and harrassing meth-
ods employed by bill collectors, insurance adjusters, and similar creditors. In
many states, the plaintiff need not show extreme and outrageous conduct to pre-
vail against bill collectors. Even negligence may suffice in some states. For an
analysis of these cases see Note, Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress in the
Debtor-Creditor Relationship, 37 ALB. L. REv. 797 (1973).
In one Louisiana case, the defendants buried a "pot of gold" for an eccentric
and mentally infirm old maid to "find" and when she did they escorted her in
triumph to city hall where she opened it in the midst of public humiliation. Nick-
erson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
215. While the Oklahoma cases finding liability for emotional distress are rel-
atively few, they illustrate the nature of the action. In Reeves v. Melton, 518 P.2d
57 (Okla. App. 1974), the defendant, alleging non-payment on a television set, had
threatened to kill the dogs at the plaintiff's house and banged on all doors and
windows while lunging at the front door trying to break in. In Bennett v. City
Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 549 P.2d 393 (Okla. App. 1975), a bank officer
threatened to ruin the plaintiff's credit and made threatening phone calls over a
debt of the plaintiff's son. In Floyd v. Dodson, 55 O.B.J. 44 at 2480 (Nov. 27,
1984), the Oklahoma Court of Appeals found sufficiently outrageous a threat to
release nude photographs and tapes of lovemaking unless a lien was released.
216. 575 P.2d 1374 (Okla. 1978).
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d (1965).
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1. The "Extreme and Outrageous" Requirement and Guinn
The plaintiff must show not only severe emotional distress but
also distress arising from acts of the defendant that are "extreme"
and "outrageous," "beyond all bounds of decency" so as to be re-
garded as "atrocious" and "utterly intolerable. '"2 18 Counsel for
Guinn attempted to demonstrate that this standard was met, and
apparently the jury found that the elders' persistence in "going
forward" after Marian told them that she did not want to consult
with them was extreme and outrageous. Counsel cited newspaper
letters attacking the church as evidence of the outrage of the
community. 19
On the extreme and outrageous issue, another central issue in
Guinn and similar discipline cases is an issue with constitutional
dimensions (this aspect is discussed in Part V). One must prove
that the elders' action was extreme and outrageous for liability to
exist. But what is the standard? Was the belief of the church about
the immorality of Guinn's sexual conduct outrageous? Was it their
insistence she would be disciplined if she did not cease such con-
duct? Is it "extreme and outrageous" for a church to advise its
members of the dismissal of another person and the reasons for
that action? Is it beyond the "bounds of decency" for a church to
hold the view (and practice consistent with it) that the body of
believers have obligations toward one another including those of
correction and discipline? A recent decision of the Ninth Circuit
recognized the danger of permitting tort liabilities grounded on vi-
olating a person's sensibilities.22 In a case involving a suit against
a church member for "shunning" a previous member, the court
noted that "offense to someone's sensibilities resulting from reli-
gious conduct is simply not actionable in tort. Without society's
tolerance of offenses to sensibility, the protection of religious dif-
ferences mandated by the first amendment would be
218. Counsel for Collinsville Church of Christ elders argued that, where the
publication allegedly creating the emotional distress arises in the context of a
qualified privilege, it cannot be "outrageous in character," citing Breeden, 575
P.2d 1374 (Okla. 1978), for the proposition that reasonable persons would disa-
gree as to whether or not conduct was outrageous, where the standard for proof
for outrageousness has not been met. The very existence of the privilege negates
the required degree of "utter intolerableness" which is the basis for emotional
distress actions.
219. The constitutional dangers of the "outrage" test are discussed below.
220. Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., 819 F.2d
875, 883 (9th Cir. 1987).
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meaningless. 221
While a standard requiring that a jury find conduct outra-
geous before triggering liability seems to be protective, in the con-
text of unpopular ideas or groups the requirement may not act as a
filter at all. In religious liberty contexts, permitting jury discretion
in such matters may invite decisions that are mere reflections of
religious hostility. May a jury, applying its own notions of appro-
priate religion, label as "outrageous" acts of a church consistent
with a major biblical and theological tradition? "Outrageousness"
too easily becomes a cultural judgment of the court or jury of the
desirability or wisdom of the church's doctrines and practices
rather than an assessment of whether or not such acts warrant civil
liability. The Guinn court failed to provide effective guidance to
the jury in assessing the outrageousness and thus opened the door
for definitions grounded on prejudice, not within the established
legal framework established for such actions.
2. Causation and Guinn
The plaintiff must further show that the actions of the defend-
ant were the cause of the harm, the mental distress. In the chain of
causation, the church may be a proximate cause of the emotional
distress, but the church is likely to ask, in a psychological and
moral frame of reference, whether its acts are the real cause of the
plaintiff's distress or not. Is it the action of the church or the con-
duct of the parties themselves? The defendant churches are likely
to agree with sociologist Helen Lynd's suggestion that the "public
exposure of even a private part of one's physical or mental charac-
ter could not in itself have brought about shame unless one had
already felt within oneself, not only dislike, but shame for these
traits." 2 2
Unlike most typical emotional distress cases, the conduct of
the church does not produce the distress. These cases do not in-
volve a malicious, evil actor taunting and threatening the innocent
plaintiff, putting that person in fear. The plaintiffis conduct is the
central basis of the distress. The defendant told the truth. Putting
persons in jeopardy of civil judgments for speaking truthfully
about the moral conduct of fellow associational members could
pose serious threats to religious liberty. In an earlier age, if a lib-
eral "infliction of emotional distress" rule such as this had been
221. Id. at 883.
222. H. LYND, ON SHAME AND THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 29 (1958).
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available, it could have dispensed with the necessity of prisons to
silence prophets who condemned immorality and injustice.
3. Emotional Distress and Guinn
While Prosser suggests that emotional distress "includes all
highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief,
shame, humiliation, anger, embarrassment, chagrin, disappoint-
ment, worry and nausea," '223 the severity of such distress must be
shown. "The emotional distress must in fact exist, and it must be
severe."224 Whether persons subject to church discipline suffer se-
vere emotional distress raises both definitional and proof problems,
but churches may choose not to contest the existence of emotional
distress. They may even choose to acknowledge their hope that the
disciplined person has what they believe is an appropriate sense of
shame or guilt hopefully leading to confession and renewal.
Churches may argue that, while there is a destructive kind of emo-
tional distress, in some respects, shame and emotional distress can
be a gift, a "mark of our humanity."22 5 Shame is a sign of our
moral accountability, a gift of our conscience, and an incident of
our humanity.22
223. W. PROSSER, INSULT AND OUTRAGE, supra note 209, at 43.
224. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 59 (4th ed. 1971).
225. SCHNEIDER, supra note 206, at ix. Schneider rejects those who would
"dismiss [shame] as a mechanism that is crippling or inhibiting" or an "obstacle
to be overcome." He insists rather that "[s]hame raises consciousness. Shame is
the partner of value awareness." Id. at xiii-xv. "Such feelings [of shame] can be
overridden, discounted or ignored only at a marked cost both to the individual
and to society." Id. at xviii.
The aspect of self-discovery in shame is illustrated in the observation of Kurt
Riezler:
You are confronted with your own meanness. Your image of yourself is
broken. You despise yourself. You will hate the man who puts you to
shame. This hate is the most bitter of all, the most difficult to heal. It
has the longest memory. Shame burns. Perhaps decades later you will
suddenly remember and blush.
Shame and Awe, MAN: MUTABLE AND IMMUTABLE 202 (1951).
Helen Merrell Lynd makes the same arresting point: "Shame interrupts any
unquestioning, unaware sense of ourselves .... Fully faced, shame may become
not primarily something to be covered, but a positive experience of revelation."
LYND, ON SHAME AND THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 20 (1958).
226. For a view that shame is destructive, see K. Millet, The Shame is Over,
Ms., Jan. 1975, at 27-29, insisting that shame is the "absolute confirmation of
'older notions and values and moralities.'" Fritz Perls, the founder of Gestalt
Therapy, declared: "I have called shame and embarrassment Quislings of the or-
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The new torts of invasion of privacy and infliction of emo-
tional distress have, at least in Guinn, proved effective legal tools
for obtaining judgments against churches in discipline contexts.
This is true notwithstanding the traditional protections of
churches found in associational and general religious liberty princi-
ples of deference to church authorities. Significant claims may be
made within traditional tort defenses that the burden of proof in
such claims was not adequately met. Additionally, claims could be
made that the judgment in Guinn misapplied legal rules of quali-
fied privilege, inappropriately weighed the legal significance of
Marian's resignation, and failed to assist in a finding of extreme
and outrageous conduct. However, the larger issue is the extent to
which such tort actions pose threats to constitutional rights of
speech and religion and threaten the vitality and integrity of reli-
gious communities.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO LIABILITY FOR CHURCH DISCIPLINE
In preceding sections this article noted the "broad rule of civil
deference 221 7 that has governed judicial intrusion into the internal
affairs of churches, a rule grounded in both the establishment and
free exercise clauses of the first amendment.1 8 Also, principles de-
rived from rights of association have supported church auton-
omy. 29 As previously noted, in a traditional tort action such as
defamation which is often alleged in church discipline cases, the
defenses of truth and qualified privilege provide substantial de-
fenses for church defendants usually without any overlay of addi-
tional constitutional protections.
However, in the context of the newer torts of invasion of pri-
vacy and infliction of emotional distress, cases such as Guinn cre-
ate tensions in applying traditional tort law. Additionally, these
cases cause problems in assessing the scope of special constitu-
ganism . .. shame, embarrassment, self-consciousness and fear restrict the indi-
vidual's expressions." F. PERLS, EGO, HUNGER AND AGGRESSION 178 (1969).
Vladimir Soloviev, the Russian 19th century philosopher, declared "[tihe
feeling of shame is a fact which absolutely distinguishes man from all lower na-
ture ... [It] is the true spiritual root of all human good and the distinctive char-
acteristic of man as a moral being." THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE GOOD (N. A. Dud-
dington trans. 1918), cited by Schneider, supra note 206, at 5. See Marin, The
New Narcissism, HARPERS, Oct. 1975, at 17.
227. L. TRIBE, supra note 49, at 877.
228. See supra notes 49-84 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 49-83 and accompanying text.
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tional limits to the imposition of liability where fundamental rights
such as free exercise are arguably at issue. The application of these
newer torts implicates constitutional liberties of religious expres-
sion of speech. As New York Times v. Sullivan" established, the
state's providing its courts for the enforcement of civil claims and
damages, including punitive damages, constitutes the requisite
state action to raise constitutional limits. If New York Times
stands in part for the principle that the potential chilling effect of
tort liabilities on the exercise of fundamental speech rights is suffi-
cient to require judicially imposed limits or liabilities, then the
same concern is appropriate where jury-imposed tort liabilities, in-
cluding punitive damages, chill the exercise of religious rights.
The article now turns to these questions of the specific appli-
cation of free exercise rights in the context of the new tort
claims.2 "
A. Religion Clause Defenses and Analyses
The first amendment protection of free exercise of religion is
the most substantial constitutional liberty implicated by state-
enabled tort claims against churches in church discipline contexts.
There is a three-step analytical process when free exercise claims
are at issue.23 This analysis must be applied to the practices of the
church in church discipline cases. First, does the civil court's in-
volvement in enforcing tort judgments against churches for acts
carrying out their religiously motivated disciplinary practices con-
stitute a burden on a sincerely held religious belief?
The sincerity of the religious belief involved in the practices of
church discipline, such as in Guinn, is beyond challenge. These
practices that are perceived as rooted in biblical commands233 have
a long tradition in Christian history and within the ecclesiastical
traditions of most denominations, 34 including the Church of
230. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
231. The protections of free exercise of religion are urgent in a society that is
becoming increasingly pluralistic and in which the regulation of life by govern-
ment at many levels is growing. The preservation of a vital segment for religious
life is critical not only to protect the vitality of religion and of individual con-
science. It is critical also because there are sound public policy grounds for recog-
nizing the value of a strong moral and prophetic voice in society, a voice that at
times will speak against the culture, even the government itself.
232. See supra notes 103-109 and accompanying text.
233. Chiefly, Matthew 18.
234. The relevance of the fact that a belief is shared by the religious commu-
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Christ. Indeed, churches are likely to view such biblically man-
dated practices as central to their moral and spiritual integrity. To
the extent that the centrality of the practices to their religious be-
liefs is perceived as having independent relevance in assessing the
burdensomeness of a state's action,236 the fact that the disciplinary
practices relate to the church's sense of integrity and biblical faith-
fulness indicates that its disciplinary beliefs are not a mere minor
doctrinal or controverted practice within the religious community.
Neither the validity, nor the reasonableness of the belief, is rele-
vant or a proper subject of judicial inquiry.236
Does the imposition of potential tort liability on persons or
churches burden the exercise of their spiritual convictions? It
hardly seems otherwise. To require that church elders and pastors
exercise church discipline consistent with their religious faith and
practices only at the risk of substantial, if not catastrophic, civil
liability certainly burdens the exercise of their religion. It creates
the type of conflict the United States Supreme Court found bur-
densome in Sherbert v. Verner.23 7 The Court found a legally cogni-
zable burden when the state forced a choice between following the
nity or denomination as a whole is limited to its value as evidence of sincerity and
does not possess any independent significance. The protection of religious belief
should not rest on whether that belief relates to some group belief because "the
guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the
members of a religious sect." Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981).
235. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court seemed to note
not only the sincerity of the Amish practices but also the centrality of those prac-
tices to the very nature of the religious community and the consequences of in-
fringements. The Court cited testimony about "great psychological harm to
Amish children" and the likelihood that the conflicts would "ultimately result in
the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community as it exists in the
United States today." 406 U.S. at 212. The Court noted that the beliefs were not
"merely a matter of personal preference, but . . . of deep religious conviction
. . ." 406 U.S. at 216. See also People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69,
394 P.2d 813 (1964), where the California Supreme Court weighed the centrality
of the belief in the use of peyote in upholding a free exercise claim and distin-
guishing it on centrality grounds from Reynolds v. United States. Id., 394 P.2d at
820.
236. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944). Note, however, Justice Jackson's dissent, suggesting it
is impossible to separate "what is believed from considerations as to what is be-
lievable." Id. at 92 (Jackson, J., dissenting). "The perception of the claimant's
sincerity inevitably reflects the factfinder's view of the reasonableness of the
claimant's beliefs." L. TRINE, supra note 49, at 861.
237. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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precepts of one's religion and subjecting one's self to state sup-
ported financial liabilities or foregoing such religious duties to min-
imize risks of liability.23 8 Seen in the church property cases, the
mere fact that the form of the legal action is in tort does not ne-
gate the essentially religious character of the issue.239 An action is
no less a potential intrusion into the affairs of religion because it is
a "tort" claim. This is supported by the "property ownership"
claims in the ecclesiastical disputes that led to the autonomy deci-
sions beginning with Watson.240 Nor does the facially neutral form
of the government's action preclude consideration of its undue
burden on the free exercise of religion.241
The Ninth Circuit recently articulated and found dispositive
this position in Paul v. Watchman Bible and Tract Society of New
York, Inc. 42 The court held that:
state laws whether statutory or common law, including tort rules,
constitute state action . . . . [Cilearly the application of tort law
to activities of a church or its adherents in their furtherance of
their religious beliefs is an exercise of state power. When the im-
position of liability would result in the abridgement of the right
of free exercise of religious beliefs, recovery in tort is barred. 43
The court assessed the religious liberty interest and concluded that
the defendant church possessed, under Washington law, an "af-
firmative defense of privilege."'12 4 Even if shunning were tortious
conduct, this defense of privilege is grounded in rights of free exer-
cise; thus "the guarantee of the free exercise of religion would pro-
vide that it is, nonetheless, privileged conduct."" 5
Second, is there a compelling state interest that justifies this
burden or intrusion? The Supreme Court established that certain
state interests may be sufficiently compelling to warrant intrusion
on religious practices as opposed to mere belief.2"' However, the
238. Id. at 404.
239. L. TRIBE, supra note 49, at 875.
240. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
241. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
242. 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987).
243. Id. at 880.
244. Id. at 879.
245. Id. at 879.
246. "Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society."
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. at
718 ("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the
least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.") See also
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interests must go beyond a "showing merely of a rational relation-
ship to some colorable state interest." "Only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation. ''247
The interest of the state and the value of the rights of reli-
gious expression must be weighed in the balance. Does the church's
action in Guinn, as the plaintiffs allege, involve such an outrage
against the conscience of civilized society that the state must act?
Is there a substantial, paramount state interest in awarding a puni-
tive damage award to Marian Guinn for the truthful revelations of
her moral conduct to her former church that compels the overrid-
ing of the church's religious practices? In the balancing process,
what weight should be given to the internal disciplinary proceed-
ings of the church (which include the formal "withdrawal of fellow-
ship" from a member or former member and the announcement to
the remaining members of the facts behind the action taken)?
Does the state's interest in enabling punitive damage awards for
persons in privacy and emotional distress actions weigh so heavily
that the rights of these churches to these limited, internal actions
are overcome? Clearly, the potential damage to the exercise of sin-
cerely held religious beliefs is substantial. Balanced against such
potential damage is the right of a former member not to have
church governing officials aware of the basis for her changed rela-
tionship with the church nor to be advised by the church regarding
their spiritual relationship to her.
The Guinn court rejected the free exercise grounded defenses,
finding a compelling interest. The reason rests, perhaps, in the in-
evitable cultural character of the compelling interest analysis. The
danger lurks not in courts' analytical processes, but rather in the
elasticity of the concept of "compelling state interests." Although
it is an essential concept, a threat to religious liberty exists because
the "compelling" definition is largely a factor defined sociologically
and politically. Such "compelling interests" are inevitably products
and conclusions of a society, or even more precariously, a jury. As
the values of a society are shaped by culture's evolving ideologies,
so are "compelling interests." "Compelling" is an evolutionary and
Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 ("[Elven when the action is in accord with
one's religious convictions [it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions.")
247. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 406 (1963), quoting Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ("[We must]
searchingly examine the interests that the state seeks to promote .... " 406 U.S.
at 221).
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slippery category. The very presence of the state in an arena is
initially unlikely to create an "interest" which soon may be discov-
ered to be "compelling." 4 8 The danger is that free exercise of reli-
gion, always weighed against such compelling interests, may be
contingent upon and vulnerable to the vagaries of a given age's vi-
sions."" It may be swallowed up in a sea of compelling state inter-
ests. Many "ideas" and practices of religious communities, if sub-
mitted to juries, may be overwhelmed by compelling interests
when assessed in the weighted scales of contemporary social or
moral values.2 50 Religion must be allowed to be counter-cultural,
out of step with society. Otherwise religion is forced to mirror soci-
ety, to be a lackey of the Zeitgeist. The prophetic and moral wit-
ness of religion would be lost in a culture in which religion must
conform to cultural values. The result would surely be a "state
church" of the type precisely rejected by constitutional prohibi-
tions against the establishment of religion. Justice Powell voiced
his concern about religion being forced to stay in step with govern-
ment or public policy in Bob Jones University v. United States.2 51
He noted the danger of any concept of qualification for tax exemp-
tion that required groups to reflect public policy would replace a
constitutional perspective that recognizes that society is best
served by a wide-open debate permitting ridiculous and offensive
notions in the marketplace of ideas.252
In the context of weighing the competing values of a church's
248. An illustration would be in the area of education where, at the founding
of the nation, education was hardly an interest at all, much less a "compelling
interest" of the state. Most education was religious, and all education was private.
Gradually, the states became involved; and over a century, states became the
main source of education establishing standards they now often seek to impose on
all education whether public or private. Courts today acknowledge with hardly a
blink a "compelling interest" of the state in education. This illustrates how, in a
relatively short time, an arena totally outside the purview of government can be-
come almost the monopoly of government, swallowing up the interests of others
and overwhelming them.
249. In the Soviet Union, for example, freedom of religion is theoretically
protected, but a Soviet version of compelling state interests constantly over-
whelms its exercise.
250. Tribe suggests that the same problem of jury insensitivity to divergent
religious belief would exist if courts permitted much inquiry into the issue of
sincerity of religious belief. "[T]he very rights ostensibly protected by the free
exercise clause might well be jeopardized by any but the most minimal inquiry
into sincerity." L. TRIBE, supra note 49, at 861.
251. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
252. Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring).
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commitment to enforcing church discipline of sexual misconduct,
the cultural factor may well act as a thumb on the scales. Contem-
porary culture's notions of "limited liability" in relationships and
"freedom without responsibility,""25 its "confusion and apathy in
the matter of moral values,"2 54 and its ideological "hostility to dis-
cipline,"255 obviously will result in a society and a jury that will
find it difficult to appreciate a disciplinary church. The same can
be said for contemporary culture's denial of real guilt,2 56 its rejec-
tion of categories of "good" and "bad,"257 suspicion about the ne-
cessity and healthiness of confession,258 its "secularization" of the
"management of the problem of guilt,"259 and its perception of the
inappropriateness of moral confrontation.260
B. Constitutional Limits on Jury Discretion
Guinn demonstrates the vulnerability of constitutionally pro-
tected rights in the face of public sentiment. Submitting the bal-
ancing of rights to juries in cases such as Guinn is certain to result
in the sort of prejudicial damage awards that were seen in the
cases which led to New York Times v. Sullivan.261 In New York
Times, the Court imposed limits on the jurors with heightened
thresholds of misconduct and rules to ensure that damage awards
were not likely to cripple the exercise of rights. In effect, the Court
imposed judicial limits as civil liberties damage control against
jury prejudice. Precisely such limiting rules equally apply in the
context of liability for invasions of privacy and infliction of emo-
tional distress.
Judicial policing of jury processes is especially appropriate
when liability, associated with the exercise of some fundamental
253. A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 97 (1970).
254. 0. H. MOWRER, THE CRISIS IN PSYCHIATRY AND RELIGION 58 (1961).
255. P. VITZ, PSYCHOLOGY AS RELIGION 62 (1977).
256. See K. MENNINGER, WHATEVER BECAME OF SIN 24, 40 (1973); W. GLASSER,
REALITY THERAPY; D. BELGUM, GUILT: WHERE RELIGION AND PSYCHOLOGY MEET 93
(1963).
257. H. LYND, ON SHAME AND THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 18 (1958).
258. "Suppressed sin, like suppressed steam, is dangerous. Confession is the
safety valve." L. Weatherhead, cited in MOWRER, supra note 54, at 213. See D.
BONHOEFFER, LIFE TOGETHER 112 (1976).
259. MOWRER, supra note 254, at 167. Mowrer complains of the abdication of
the church in the healing of guilt and moral failure. See also MENNINGER, supra
note 256, at 24.
260. P. TOURNIER, GUILT AND GRACE 80 (1958).
261. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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rights, rests in part on a jury's judgment of the social acceptability
of certain conduct. In weighing liability for infliction of emotional
distress, the Guinn jury's task was to assess whether the plaintiff's
conduct was outrageous. But in the context of protected rights
such as free speech, free press, and free exercise, juries must be
bound by careful judicial principles lest popularity or acceptability
become a prerequisite for the protection of expression. Certainly, if
community outrage is a sufficient basis for restricting the exercise
of fundamental rights, social justice, human rights, and religious
liberty would be in serious jeopardy. If religion is to be judged by
contemporary moral standards, then many faiths would be seen as
out of step, archaic, and then perhaps as outrageous. The Guinn
decision reflects the dangers in turning to juries to assess the ap-
propriateness of religious doctrines and moral assessments." 2 Indi-
vidual rights should not be indiscriminately subject to ad hoc jury
determinations. People have at various points in history been out-
raged by integration, civil rights, and even democracy. Outrage
alone cannot be a basis, especially when fundamental rights such
as speech or religion are involved.
In the arena of constitutional protections of speech, courts
have recognized the constitutional impermissibility of allowing un-
popularity or mere offensiveness to silence expression. Speech can-
not be barred merely because it creates emotional reactions.263 In-
deed, the Supreme Court recognized that vigorous and effective
public discourse often includes the offensive.2 4 Juries, however,
are simply not very tolerant of unpopular ideas. The problems of
unfettered jury discretion in church discipline cases could be re-
solved by applying constitutionally grounded and judicially en-
262. In Oklahoma, as set forth by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Breeden,
575 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Okla. 1978), it is the court's, not the jury's, task to first
"determine whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so
extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery." Importantly, only where reasona-
ble persons could disagree should the issue be given to the jury. Where the court
has the duty of first finding that at least some reasonable persons might hold the
conduct was sufficiently outrageous, the court can prevent vindictive juries from
using their powers to punish merely unpopular ideas. The role of the courts is not
simply to provide a vehicle for prejudice through civil suits but to assure that any
alleged conduct could reasonably be found to be legally sufficiently extreme and
outrageous.
263. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
264. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (barring conviction based on
speech which "involves a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with condi-
tions as they are, or even stirs people to anger"). 337 U.S. at 4).
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forced standards, much as are required by New York Times in def-
amation cases.265  Commentators advocate precisely such a
"definitional," as opposed to "ad hoc," standard as reducing the
"impact of popular sentiment" and "lessen[ing] the chilling effect
on expression by increasing certainty over what was actionable. 2 66
C. Constitutionally Grounded Limits on Punitive Damages
The Guinn decision reinforces the need for constitutionally
grounded judicial guidance over the availability of punitive damage
awards. Guinn is not unique in reflecting a jury's willingness to
render substantial punitive damage awards against unpopular reli-
gious defendants. In Oregon, a jury awarded two million dollars in
favor of a woman who withdrew from the Church of Scientology
alleging fraud in the church's promises of a better life for her. 61
That decision was overturned.268 In 1985, a jury again awarded the
plaintiff money damages, this time thirty-nine million dollars.6 '
On July 22, 1986, a California jury awarded thirty million dollars
to Larry Wollershiem, a former member of the Church of
Scientology, on his claim that he did not obtain the promised spiri-
tual powers.2 70 Interviews with jurors in the "clergy malpractice"
suit against John MacArthur and Grace Community Church 27' re-
portedly showed that some jurors sided with the plaintiffs because
they felt the church was too narrow or strict. 72 A United States
265. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
349-50 (1974).
266. Comment, Religious Torts: Applying the Consent Doctrine as Defini-
tional Balancing, supra note 196, at 973. The author of the comment concludes,
"Applying a definitional balancing standard would similarly protect first amend-
ment interests in religious tort cases because they present comparable problems
of public influencing and chilling." Id. at 973. See also M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 2, at 17 (1984).
267. Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, No. A77 04 05184 (Or. Cir. Ct.
Multnomah County Sept. 5, 1979).
268. 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206, 1227
(1983).
269. No. A77 04 05184 (Or. Cir. Ct., Multnomah County July 19, 1985).
270. Wollershiem v. Church of Scientology, No. C 332-027 (Super. Ct. County
of Los Angeles 1986).
271. Nally v. Grace Community Church, No. NCC 18668-B (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Los Angeles County May 16, 1985), reprinted in 5 Religious Freedom Reporter 91
(May 1985). The court granted the defendant church's motion for nonsuit and
dismissal.
272. Reported in conversations with Sam Ericsson, counsel to Grace Commu-
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district court jury awarded $138,000 to a man who alleged that two
Transcendental Meditation organizations falsely promised he could
fly."' 3 Such judgments by jurors reflect the dangers of allowing
them to determine the liberties of conscience and religious life.
These liberties must flourish not only when popularly hailed but
also when rejected. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court noted
that traditional tort rules relating to the scope and nature of dam-
ages impermissibly gave juries uncontrolled discretion to award
damages unrelated to actual injuries thereby permitting the selec-
tive punishment of unpopular views.27
Courts have increasingly recognized constitutional limits on
state laws creating liability and imposing damages in privacy ac-
tions, especially in situations of reporting about the "private" lives
of public officials or public figures. These limits have been most
stringent in rules relating to punitive damage awards because of
the chilling effect such financial penalties may create. The limits
arise because of the constitutional commitment to an "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open" 275 discussion on public issues. In defama-
tion actions, public figures may succeed only when they can show
actual malice or a reckless disregard of truth.2 76 The central con-
cern in New York Times was the chilling effect 27 7 not only of ac-
tual liability, but also of potential liability. That such punitive
damage claims and awards often exceed the total assets of the de-
fendant church reinforces the danger of making churches liable for
such damages on the basis of rather unclear and amorphous
standards.
VI. CONCLUSION
Principles of individual and collective rights of association
nity Church.
273. Kropinski v. World Plan Executive Council (Civ. No. 85-2848, Dist. Ct.
D.C. Jan. 13, 1987). The jury did reject claims for nine million dollars in punitive
damages.
274. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
275. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
276. Id. at 279-80.
277. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) ("The chilling effect
upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of prosecu-
tion unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure."). See Comment, Reli-
gious Torts: Applying the Consent Doctrine as Definitional Balancing, supra
note 196, at 971 et seq.; Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 808, 809 (1969).
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generally provide religious associations with substantial rights to
govern their own internal affairs including the admission and dis-
missal of members. In the case of religious associations, principles
of church autonomy and deference to church affairs, and the more
specific prohibitions against excessive entanglement or infringe-
ment on free exercise absent a compelling state interest, provide
additional protections (grounded on constitutional principles) for
religious communities in their self-governance. These principles re-
flect sound policy and assure both religious liberty and the integ-
rity of religious associations against unwarranted or excessive state
intrusion which breaches the wall of separation. This deference,
except under the most compelling circumstances, is sound policy,
particularly when an intrusion would impose restraints and con-
trols on the internal and doctrinal affairs of religious bodies. Pro-
fessor Laycock correctly noted that such principles are most com-
manding when they touch the internal affairs of the church and
relationships among voluntary members.2 78
These principles of deference, primarily established in prop-
erty disputes, are derived from the first amendment prohibitions of
the establishment clause and guarantees of free exercise. Because
these principles are grounded in basic constitutional principles,
they are equally applicable in tort actions. In defamation actions
against religious associations, traditional tort defenses of truth and
qualified privilege provided appropriate limits on tort actions in
the context of defamation actions which impact freedom of speech.
However, the more recent tort actions of invasion of privacy and
infliction of emotional distress may, as Guinn illustrates, pose seri-
ous threats to the autonomy of religious communities to govern
their own internal affairs consistent with their religious convic-
tions. The failure of courts to fence such actions within carefully
defined constitutional parameters may result in serious erosions of
the protections of religious liberty. The potential for unbridled
jury discretion reflective of prejudice and for excessive punitive
damage awards against unpopular religious bodies requires careful
judicial management of such tort actions as recognized in the defa-
278. Laycock, supra note 91, at 1403. Suggesting tests for autonomy, Laycock
notes the case for autonomy is strongest when the matter is internal, the religious
aspect of the issue is intense, and the threat of regulation (by prohibition or in-
centives) would substantially encourage abandonment of a religious practice (as
opposed to state involvement which might only make such activities somewhat
more expensive).
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mation area in New York Times v. Sullivan.2 79 Such proper judi-
cial control will not bar recovery in deserving cases but will assure
that such tort actions do not become vehicles for either indirect
control of internal church affairs or unwarranted and intrusive fi-
nancial penalties against unpopular religious beliefs, assessed by
unsympathetic juries in favor of disgruntled plaintiffs. While the
Guinn trial court decision properly may be reversed based solely
on the application of recognized tort defenses, the fundamental
constitutional issues raised by the decision should not be ignored
by the appellate courts.
279. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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